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This paper was partly prepared under the sponsorship of the
Directorate for Mobilization and Deployment Planning, the Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and
Logistics)--OASD(MRA&L).
The research began six years ago as a comparative study of
manpower policies and issues in the ground forces of seven northern
and central European NATO countries. As it became apparent that
these nations have adopted a variety of manpower policies and ground
force structures depending on internal and external national
conditions, earlier studies were expanded to include a detailed
analysis of Danish and Norwegian ground force structures as well as
an analysis of the transition and mobilization problems associated
with changing from a peacetime to a wartime organization.
This present study expands on earlier comparisons by providing
additional information on Danish and Norwegian manpower policies and
ground force structures as well as providing parallel information
for the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and for the
United Kingdom. A well -functioning registration system is necessary
to support conscription and to ensure a rapid mobilization of
reservists, therefore the national and military registration systems
are also included. Because present policies are influenced by
history and traditions, relevant historical developments are
presented.




Comparative studies of manpower policies, peacetime force
structures, and the character and time-phased availability of
augmentation or reserve forces are important for several reasons.
First, such studies are necessary ingredients in building and
maintaining more efficient NATO force structures as well as in
military balance assessments. Second, a useful baseline for
negotiating meaningful force reductions must include both peacetime
strengths as well as the time-phased availability of wartime
augmentations. Finally, studies of other nations' policies can
generate ideas for alternative policies and yield insight into
implementation problems.
However, information provided by current, standard comparative
sources is insufficient for dealing with these issues.
Consequently, relative to hardware, the manpower dimensions of force
structures have been given little comparative analytic attention.
This study, part of continuing research, is based on national
publications and documents as well as on direct assistance from
defense authorities and experts in Europe. Its organization places
a discussion of major manpower issues first, followed by a four
country comparative examination of manpower procurement policies,
manpower dimensions of ground force structures, and national and
military manpower registration systems. A part of this examination
is a brief overview of relevant historic facts for each nation.
The comparison of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany
(West Germany), Norway, and the United Kingdom (Britain), showed a
diversity of policies with respect to force structures, manpower
policies, reserve utilization, and the military role of women. It
is also clear that the technology selected by individual nations for
their ground forces is influenced by national conditions as well as
by manpower policies.
mThere exists no apparent evidence that NATO membership has
significantly influenced these four nations' manpower policies and
ground force structures. Analysis of their policies illustrates
that their contrasting arrangements are responses to extremely
different conditions of population density, terrain, and internal
communications as well as to differences in geo-strategic location,
traditions, and defense missions.
Except for the United Kingdom, these countries have retained
conscription as a major manpower procurement method. Denmark, the
Federal Republic of Germany, and Norway—which to varying degrees
have served as battlegrounds and primarily are concerned with
territorial defense—have historically relied on conscription. A
reduction or elimination of the conscripted component has been
debated, but in general the concept has wide acceptance and is seen
as necessary and desirable.
Neither Denmark, West Germany, nor Norway have universal
military conscription— respecti vely, approximately 30, 58, and
somewhat over 60 percent of male age cohorts complete regular active
duty in one of the armed services. The lengths of regular duty and
reserve obligation also vary from nation to nation.
Attempts to approximate universal conscription combined with
prolonged reserve obligation tend to result in relatively inflexible
or rigid force structures. While continuity of policies and
practices has advantages, this may also inhibit changes which
otherwise would have been made.
The peacetime armies of Denmark and West Germany have 30 and 51
percent conscripts, respectively. Consequently, their armies could
be characterized as volunteer armies with conscript components.
Norway, on the other hand, has 80 percent conscripts in the
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peacetime army. Today's conscripts, however, are better qualified
upon induction than ever before. The training period is also used
more effectively. In addition, part of the conscripted component
consists of "quasi volunteers"--many have either been obligated to
or have volunteered for training over and above the minimum.
All four nations plan to mobilize a significant number of
reservists in case of crisis. Denmark and Norway must mobilize
approximately 90 percent of its full wartime potential.
Corresponding percentages for West Germany and Britain are 65 and
56, respectively. The readiness of this mobilization potential is
relatively high, but Norway and the United Kingdom face potentially
significant deployment problems.
In the four study nations, all field army reservists have prior
service; i.e., all have completed a regular tour of duty. Men and
women without prior service, however, may volunteer to the Danish
Home Guard and to the British Territorial Army and the Ulster
Defence Regiment.
Women have a limited role in these nations' armed services.
But their role is expanding, not primarily because of "equal rights"
pressures, but because male age cohorts are shrinking. None of
these nations currently obligate women for mobilization assignments
upon completion of regular duty. However, in some cases they may
volunteer for mobilization roles.
Military technology increasingly requires more extensive
training for operation or for maintenance. To varying degrees, this
has been taken into account in force structures and utilization of
manpower. Longer term volunteers and conscripts with extended
obligations are increasingly trained to fill complex tasks.
Rationalization, standardization, and interoperability are
promoted as means to deal with NATO resource dilemmas. However, the
diversity of manpower policies and force structures may limit both
the feasibility and the desirability of standardization. For
example, the time required to introduce new equipment as well as
replacement rates vary from nation to nation. Topography, climate
and soil conditions as well as manpower policies and practices put
requirements on technical characteristics. It is also possible that
diversity means strength rather than weakness.
A multi-dimensional assessment of manpower policies and
manpower dimensions of ground force structures is complicated,
costly, time-consuming, and requires extensive data search or
improved data bases. However, such studies will result in more
meaningful comparisons of national capabilities and evaluations of
military balances, in more useful baselines for force reduction
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1I. INTRODUCTION
ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
This introductory chapter briefly discusses some of the
manpower issues facing nations and alliances today and outlines one
theoretical framework for analyzing national manpower policies and
force structures.
The second chapter provides historical background to help
understand current policies regarding both the regular (peacetime)
and the reserve (mobilization) forces of four NATO nations:
Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Norway, and the United
Kingdom. The chapter also describes these four nations' current
manpower policies and practices, ground force structures, and the
national and military registration systems.
The final chapter summarizes and draws conclusions.
WHY STUDY NON-U. S. NATO MANPOWER POLICIES?
Relative to hardware, the manpower dimensions of force
structures have been given little analytic attention. Several
professional journals deal quite well with weapons and equipment,
but no journal deals equally well with manpower issues.
The manpower policies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) countries represent an important factor in the potential
effectiveness of NATO forces. But NATO is an alliance lacking
supra-national authority. It is composed of sovereign nations, and
it is a conglomerate of different systems and philosophies that are
reflected in their defense policies.* An investigation of present
1-NATO was established under a treaty signed on April 4, 1949 by
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. Three years later Greece and Turkey joined the Alliance,
and the Federal Republic of Germany became a signatory on receiving
its sovereignty in 1955.
policies and the underlying conditions as well as the implications
of diverse policies may lead to decisions resulting in a more
effective NATO force structure.
Pressures on peacetime defense budgets in the face of Warsaw
Pact conventional improvements, have led to an increased emphasis in
NATO on less expensive reserve forces for rapid augmentation of
peacetime forces during mobilization as well as for sustained
operations. However, because of a lack of readily available
information on the usefulness and time- phased availability of
reserve augmentations, these are frequently excluded from military
balance assessments and from U.S. reinforcement planning for a
European scenario.
There is also talk of improving the efficiency with which
NATO's resources are being used. Rationalization, standardization,
and interoperability (RSI) are promoted as means to deal with the
resource dilemma. However, seldom are these slogans defined in any
great detail, and rarely if ever are the implications— if any--of
diverse manpower policies and force structures for successful RSI
investigated.
Comparative studies of manpower policies, peacetime force
structures, and the character and time-phased availability of aug-
mentation or reserve forces are important for several reasons.
First, such studies are necessafy ingredients in building and main-
taining more efficient Alliance force structures as well as in mili-
tary balance assessments. Second, a useful baseline for negotiating
force reductions must include both peacetime strengths as well as
the time-phased availability of wartime augmentations. Finally,
studies of other nations' policies can generate ideas for alterna-
tive policies and yield insight into implementation problems.
Because ground force structures are the main users of manpower
and because ground forces vary greatly with respect to manpower
procurement and utilization policies, the focus is on manpower
dimensions of peacetime and wartime structures.
3THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING MANPOWER POLICIES AND FORCE
STRUCTURES
This section identifies and discusses some of the manpower-
related choices facing defense decisionmakers. First, the
organization of and the relationship between the peacetime and the
wartime organization are important issues to be faced. Second,
choices exist between procuring only volunteers or a mix of
conscripts and volunteers. Third, the trade-off between the number
of recruits required to man a force of given size and the length of
regular active duty has political, economic and military
implications. Fourth, in determining the lengths of regular duty
and reserve obligation, the costs and benefits over the entire
service life of each individual serviceman warrants examination.
Finally, even when policies are implemented to primarily affect the
standing, regular forces, the (Total Force) analysis is
comprehensive only if it takes into account consequences for both
the standing and the reserve component.
Peacetime and Wartime Organizations
Force structure is defined in this paper as the mix of active
and reserve manpower, the allocation of functions among active and
reserve manpower, and the way in which conscripts and volunteers fit
into the system. Therefore, force structures reflect manpower
policies and practices, and differences in manpower policies lead to
diverse force structures.
1
To facilitate the understanding of concepts to be used later in
the study, Figure 1 shows four examples of potential force
structures and the differences in the relationship between peacetime
forces, effective force strength (forces-in-being, standing forces)
and the reserve mobilization or augmentation components of a wartime
force.
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Aggregate peacetime or regular active military manpower
includes those in the formal wartime organization (effective force
strength) plus individuals in training, patients, prisoners,
transients, and those in administrative functions. 1 The first
case, Country Q, is an example of a force structure with no reserve
augmentation in case of war. Country X exemplifies the case with a
relatively small augmentation, and Country Y one with a relatively
large wartime augmentation of the peacetime force. Country Z shows
the case of a wartime augmentation of the peacetime force, but with
a large civilian pool of unassigned, but militarily trained
manpower. The wartime component (effective force strength) of the
peacetime force, therefore, constitutes only a part of the full
peacetime force. Even so, because the numbers are more accessible,
most military balance assessments focus on the full peacetime force
and generally ignore mobilization augmentations.
Reservists may be organized and trained in peacetime in units
that supplement or complement active forces, or they may be used for
(1) rapid augmentation by manning peacetime units to full wartime
strength or by manning immediately available reserve units, and for
(2) sustained operations by providing individual replacements or by
manning additional units formed after mobilization.
Manpower Procurement Alternatives
Various methods can be used for procuring manpower. Fig. 2
suggests one categorization useful for analyzing and choosing among
(a mix of) procurement alternatives. Defense manpower consists of
both military and civilian manpower, and nations may vary the degree
to which defense functions are "ci vilianized". Military manpower
may be procured through a purely voluntary system or through a
1-For now, those in administrative functions are excluded from
effective force strength because frequently these are performed by
civilians. Later, however, this manpower will be included if



































voluntary system combined with conscription (draft). Futhermore,
volunteers and conscripts may be used in both the regular active (or
standing) force and the reserve or mobilization force. Civilians
may be utilized in the defense sector through direct employment or
indirectly under service contracts. Furthermore, given the
existence of appropriate legislation, civilians or civilian sector
services may be requisitioned in case of emergencies.
Issues related to manpower procurement which must be addressed
include (1) the recruitment and retention of volunteers, and (2) the
assignment problem associated with universal conscription or
alternatively, the selection problem associated with selective
conscription, where selection can be performed through exemption and
deferment policies, lottery, or by setting strict physical and
mental standards.
The most commonly observed arguments for (some degree of)
conscription include (1) compulsory service is an essential civic
duty; i.e., it is a democratic way of building defense, (2) the
resulting high population participation rate in the defense sector
integrates the military and civilian sector, (3) only conscription
can raise sufficient troops of the desired quality, (4) with current
budgetary restrictions, the established strengths cannot be met with
volunteers alone, and (5) because many young men choosing to
volunteer for extended military duty come from the ranks of
conscripts, recruitment of volunteers is aided by conscript!* on. 1
iThese and the following arguments are dealt with in more detail
in Ragnhild Sohlberg, Defense Manpower Policies in Northern and
Central European NATO , N-1314-MRAL, The Rand Corporation, February
1980, pp. 5-16.
8However, adherence to at least some degree of conscription
certainly also has some disadvantages. For example, the training of
a large number of conscripts in combat or other standing units has
led to decreased readiness of standing forces. Unless conscripts
are assigned the same or similar functions during their regular
active and reserve duty periods, they must be retrained for the
reserve function. Because volunteers and conscripts often belong to
the same age group but are accorded different status, rights,
standard of living, etc., the personal relationship between them may
suffer. In some European nations, significant improvements in
conscripts' compensation and conditions of service in the postwar
period have diminished the financial justification for maintaining
this procurement method. 1 Rarely if ever is universal conscrip-
tion attained, therefore, the inequity argument is dominant in
several nations. 2 it is argued that modern technology and warfare
methods require personnel with extensive, and hence, expensive
military training. For this training to be cost- effective, trained
personnel must serve long terms (to be discussed later).
However, long-term volunteers are not only advantageous. On
the average, they will be older, may have higher career expectations
and consequently will be dissatisfied with simple, undemanding tasks
for prolonged periods, and will be more costly because of higher
compensation, more fringe benefits and free time, and because of
family obligations. Because of the dislocations and inconveniences
associated with frequent moves and unattractive base locations for
the family, retention of long-term personnel may require that more
consideration is given to deployment and basing than is required for
conscripts. Also, a large proportion of long-term volunteers may
result in a military elite isolated from society as a whole.
^Parallel costs have also increased with respect to volunteers
while the effective work-time has decreased, resulting in increased
cost per effective work-hour for both volunteers and conscripts.
^The inequity argument rests on the assumption that universal
conscription is more inequitable than selective conscription. This
in fact may not always be the case, rather "fair" exemption and
deferment policies may increase equity in conscription.
Trade-off Between Recruits Required and Length of Regular
Active Duty
Fig. 3 shows the tradeoff between the number of recruits
inducted annually and the length of regular active duty; given force
strength or size. The example uses a desired force size of 10 n
,
where n is any integer. * If the length of regular active duty is
fixed at 12 months, then 10n recruits need be inducted annually.
If the length of active duty is reduced to six months; i.e., cut in
half, then twice as many recruits (2 x 10n ) need be inducted. On
the other hand, if the length of regular active duty is doubled to
24 months, then only half as many recruits (.5 x 10n ) need be
inducted annually. This trade-off (or isoquant) curve also shows
that as the length of duty increases in equal increments, the
incremental savings in annual requirements for new recruits
decreases.
Alternatively, if a reduction in force size is planned, for
example, from the higher level indicated by A to a point on the
curve; i.e., to a force size of 10n , this reduction can be
achieved either by reducing regular duty from 18 to approximately
six months (B), by reducing annual accessions (C), or by a
combination of reduced accessions and reduced regular duty (as
represented by the curve between B and C).
Cost-Effectiveness of Manpower
Qualitative manpower dimensions, however, are not constant
along the trade-off curve. Fig. 4 demonstrates one hypothetical
cost-effectiveness time-profile of an individual serviceman.
Assuming a typical learning curve, the skill level of this
individual increases through basic training and continues to do so













































































































































during regular active duty. However, after some time-period, the
learning curve levels off.* Upon discharge, this individual is
under reserve obligation, but military skills deteriorate. Upon
recall to reserve or refresher training, the skill -level again
rises.
The specific location and shape of the skill -level curve depend
on the individual's skills and talents upon induction, motivation,
quality and relevance of training, the complexity of the functional
assignment, etc.
2
The rapidity with which the skill level deteriorates or becomes
irrelevant during the reserve obligation, depends on how well skills
are entrenched upon discharge from regular duty, the relationship
between military assignment and civilian sector pursuits, the rate
of change in military organization and equipment, etc. If a
reservist's civilian occupation is closely related to his military
assignment, it is certainly possible that the skill level and the
effectiveness curves rise after discharge from active duty.
The defense effectiveness of an individual, however, may not
correspond directly to the skill level. For a regular active duty
soldier, effectiveness also depends on unit readiness (training,
equipment) as well as on deployment or deployment capabilities. For
1 1 f the individual is assigned tasks unrelated to his wartime
function or loses motivation or physical fitness, the skill level
may actually decline after some point.
2lt is not suggested that the location and shape of these curves
need be estimated. Rather, the model is only intended to help
identify and evaluate policies and consequences of alternative
policies—focusing on policies which may yield increased net benefit
or decreased net cost over the military "life-time" of an
individual .
13
a reservist, effectiveness also depends on the individual's
time-phased availability, including the effectiveness of a national
or military registration system. * Because of child care
obligations and pregnancies, on the average, the uncertainties
associated with the time-phased availability of female reservists
are greater than for male reservists. Consequently, in most
military capacities, a woman reservist is not as cost-effective as a
man.
The cost curve in Fig. 4 assumes that this individual is a
conscript who is rather costly during basic training because of the
need for supervision and instructors, unskilled handling of
equipment, etc. During regular duty, this hypothetical conscript
receives no increase in compensation, requires less supervision, and
handles equipment with greater care. Upon discharge to reserve
status, costs are limited to administration, record-keeping, storage
and maintenance of equipment, etc. and only rise during times of
recall.
The specific shape and location of the cost curve depend on the
compensation level --for example, whether conscript or volunteer-
training requirements, etc.
Fig. 4, therefore, demonstrates that a determination of the
cost-effectiveness of an individual must take into account
contributions and costs both during regular and reserve duty. At
minimum the lengths of regular and reserve duty must be determined
so that the benefits perceived as obtained during an individual's
military "life-time" at least outweighs the costs. Mobilization and
deployment plans, for example, help determine the effectiveness of a
reservist.
^For a discussion of manpower mobilization, ref: Ragnhild
Sohlberg, Defense Manpower Policy Analysis: NATO Ground Forces
,
P-6532, The Rand Corporation, June 1980, Chapter IV.
14
Total Force Analysis
Fig. 5 demonstrates the dependence between regular and reserve
policies at the force level. This simple example identifies some
non-financial consequences of increasing the length of regular
active duty.l Other policies are unchanged. For example, regular
force size, given by the area under the solid or broken line, is
held constant.
The solid lines indicate the situation before length of
regular active duty is increased. The broken lines indicate the
situation after the policy change. As the length of regular active
duty is increased, fewer individuals need be recruited annually; the
reduction indicated by line a-b. At any one time, fewer individuals
are in basic training; indicated by area A. Military effectiveness,
or readiness of the standing, regular force, may be measured by the
number of individuals with training over and above the earlier
maximum level; given by area B.
A comprehensive Total Force analysis, however, weighs not only
the consequences for the regular force but also those for the
reserve force. It is assumed that before the policy change, a
certain proportion of individuals discharged from regular duty
enters the reserve force annually; indicated by line 0-c. After the
policy change, fewer persons are discharged annually from regular
duty, reducing the number available for the reserve component; the
reduction measured by line c-d. In a steady state and without
compensatory or offsetting reserve policies, the reserve force
strength is reduced; indicated by area C.
^Possible financial consequences include savings in recruitment
and basic training costs, or alternatively, a chance to increase
effectiveness of recruitment and basic training. Any savings may be
offset by the need to increase compensation because of extended
duty. For more details on analyzing consequences of changing the





























































This simple model also shows that if, for example, it is
desirable to reduce total force size and rather provide remaining
units with better training and equipment, this can be achieved by
reducing the intake to either the regular or the reserve force. If,
for political reasons, it is also desirable to continue to recruit a
large proportion of the population, the force reduction can be
achieved by only reducing the reserve obligation. This latter
change would in itself also result in a younger and possibly better
trained force.
Having identified and discussed some choices confronting
defense decisionmakers, the next chapter investigates the manpower
procurement policies, ground force structures, and national and
military registration systems of four NATO nations. Because
traditions to a large degree have formed current policies and
practices and also constitute constraints on change, a brief
historic overview is provided initially for each nation.
17
II. NATIONAL SYSTEMS
This chapter provides some historical background to help
understand today's manpower procurement policies and describes
current policies, ground force structures, and national and military
registration systems of four NATO nations: Denmark, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Norway, and the United Kingdom.
DENMARK
Background
Conscription in Denmark has traditions back to about 800 A.D.
when the Vikings were looting Europe. The country was divided into
areas, each obligated to provide one man for the Army. Due to the
cost of maintaining a large force, this system was later replaced by
one where each great landowner had to provide one fully equipped
horseman, and every man had an obligation to serve in person within
the national borders in the event of a threat of national disaster.
Up to 1849 conscription was used to various degrees, but in
that year universal compulsory national service was introduced with
the first democratic constitution. This "basic military law" was
reenacted in the Constitution of 1953.
The concept of "universal and equal" national service has
generally not applied in Denmark. During the first decades
following 1849, the more privileged parts of the people avoided such
service. During the period between the two world wars, Denmark had
a very limited military potential, so it was not necessary to
provide military training to all young men in the relevant age
groups. During this period draft by lottery was introduced.
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Partly due to Denmark's membership in NATO, all men fit for
military service were called up in the period following World War
III. About 25 percent were rejected for health reasons. In more
recent years it has been possible for conscriptees to substitute
military service with civilian compulsory national service. This
latter option was selected by about 15 percent of those liable for
compulsory service.
Manpower Procurement Policies
Traditionally, the major manpower procurement policy in Denmark
has been conscription. Because force size has always been small
relative to the population base, selective rather than universal
conscription has been the rule.^ The Defense Agreement of 1973
also resulted in an organization that did not require calling up
everybody fit for military service. One reason given for this
change was that the relatively limited employment of regulars,
particularly in the Army, meant that in the past, a large part of
the budget had been used for training conscripts. Since 1973, while
a somewhat higher proportion may be inducted, only about one -third
of each male age cohort completes first-term active duty in the
military. Selection is done by lottery.
3
On January 1, 1976 the legal age at which young men make
initial contact with the military for classification, was reduced by
three months to 19.25 years; i.e., the legal conscription age was
1 In 1971 women were permitted to apply for employment as regular
other ranks--in principle under conditions similar to those
applicable to male personnel, but with some limitations regarding
fields of service and training activity. By June 1975, 420 women




^Uni versal ity was only approximated immediately following Danish
entry into NATO in 1949.
3
"Dansk Brigad" (Danish Brigade), Armenytt , No. 4, Sweden, 1980,
p. 22.
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lowered. However, there are opportunities to voluntarily enter the
military earlier than at age 19.25.1
The defense reorganization in 1973 reduced first term, regular
active duty to nine months. Non-commissioned officers (NCOs) have
to serve an additional six months, and those who volunteer to serve
as reserve officers, an additional nine months.
Figure 6 shows the manpower flows through the Danish ground
forces.
Conscripts are trained during their nine months initial
military service (18 months for sergeants). In the Army, they are
placed in a Training Force which has no explicit wartime function.
Here the conscripts are trained to fill less complicated functions
in the Augmentation Force or other reserve functions. If assigned
to the Augmentation Force after discharge from regular active duty,
for up to 18 months they are subject to immediate recall in case of
crisis.
After release from the Augmentation Force assignment or
directly after regular active duty, a conscript is assigned to
regular reserve units in the Field Army Reserve (Other Reserve
Units), to the Local Defense Force , or to a Personnel Replacement
Depot . The maximum military obligation today is nine years.
However, the theoretical obligation lasts until a man is 50 years
old. Even after 50 years of age, he is under legal obligation to
participate within Total Defense ^ until 55 years old; i.e., in the
Home Guard or in Civil Defense.
^ Fakta om forsvar
,
(Facts about Defense), Defense Command, Press-
and Information Service, Vedbaek , January 1978, pp. 28-29.
^In the Scandinavian countries Total Defense covers military and
non-military defense. Non-military defense includes civil defense,




The all -volunteer (combat -ready) Standing Force recruits only
from those who have completed nine months in the Training Force.
Those volunteers are obligated for at least 24 additional months of
active duty: i.e., a minimum of 33 months.
After serving in the Standing Force, volunteers are still
obligated to complete nine years of military obligation. Most
volunteers, however, having more military training than conscripts,
are assigned to units in the Covering Force Reserve .
Conscripts who have completed their first-term duty, are
qualified and encouraged to enlist for voluntary full-time service
with one of the units assigned to UN-duty, for further military
training during spare time as a member of the Home Guard, or for
social activities in a soldier's association. If he enlists for
voluntary service, he has the right to obtain civilian education at
the expense of the military after completion of 33 months (including
the nine months of first-term compulsory service).
If a conscript cannot obtain a civilian job immediately upon
dismissal, he has the right to receive some form of unemployment
compensation or other assistance.
Peacetime and Wartime Ground Force Structure
Because of geographic and demographic characteristics as well
as the ease of transportation, the Danish Army has traditionally
relied rather heavily on mobilization. This reliance increased
somewhat as a result of the 1973 Defense Agreement. The structure
which has been implemented since then, is shown in Table 1.1
1-Chief of Defense, Handout on the Danish Armed Forces
,
(various
years), and information obtained during visits to Danish Defense
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The Army Wartime Force , comprising the Covering Force and the
Mobilization Force , is structured around five armoured infantry
brigades. Three of the brigades belong to the Jutland command and
two to Zealand. Due to variations in their standing forces, the
brigades differ slightly in organization. The typical armoured
infantry brigade structure is shown in Fig. 7.
None of the brigades is fully manned in peacetime. Rather, the
Standing Force of 8500 professional soldiers man key positions,
units, and weapons. Only immediate defense tasks can be undertaken
by this force alone. In case of crisis, units from the Augmentation
Force (4500 men) are expected to be in place within 24 hours.
Recall of manpower in the Augmentation Force does not require a
regular mobilization order. After consultation with the Minister of
Defense, the Chief of Army can recall these reservists. 1 The
augmentation units provide some immediate support to the Standing
Force. The Standing Force plus the Augmentation Force form the
Covering Force .
Subsequently, combat and support units and individuals from the
Covering Force Reserve are called up. These 12,000 men bring
standing units to their full wartime strength and full operations at
the brigade level can take place.
Finally, other reserve support units will be called up. This
system of phased call-up is related to the priority of tasks
involved. The whole mobilization process is expected to be
completed within M + 3 days.
To ensure full manning in the event of mobilization, each
reserve unit is authorized at a manning level of 10 percent above
the Table of Organi zation^. If some personnel are not immediately
lH Dansk Brigad," Armenytt , nr. 4, 1980, pp. 18-22.
^The Table of Organization (and equipment) sets out the authorized
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available at mobilization, each unit recalls 10 percent more
manpower than is required to reach wartime strength. Surprise
(alarm) call-ups have resulted in close to 100-percent manning
levels. The Field Army draws some of its cadre personnel and
support elements from among the 7250 men in administrative units,
schools, etc.
About 7000 men in the Field Army Reserve Force of 41 ,000 men
are assigned to a "temporary security force."! This force is
organized into high priority reserve units in the Covering Force
Reserve, and the members are provided with a special call-up order
in case of mobilization. The remainder, about 34,000 men, are
formed into lower priority units. When all these units are in
place, sustained operations can be conducted.
The Mobilization Force consists of the Field Army Reserve Force
and the Local Defense Force . Regional Defense comprises the Local
Defense Force and the Home Guard. In peacetime, the Local Defense
Force consists of seven regional staffs and a few units necessary to
ensure a rapid and effective mobilization of local defense units.
The Home Guard, consisting of both men and women, maintain personal
equipment, weapons, and ammunition at home. Consequently, they can
be rapidly mobilized?.
Of the 78,000 men in the Army Wartime Force, about 10,000 are
not fully equipped with modern battle uniforms. These men belong to
the lowest priority units, mainly in the Local Defense Force.
Of the roughly 200 tanks in the Wartime Force, about 160 are
fully manned in peacetime. The Standing Force is therefore able to
provide initial defense against limited but concentrated attacks on
Danish territory.
l-Forel^pig sikringsstyrke.
^Defense Command, Dansk Forsvar af i dag (Danish Defense of
Today), Vedbaek , October 1977, pp. 27-28.
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Each Field Army brigade is composed of individuals and units
from (1) the Standing Force--headquarter units, one infantry
battalion located on the island of Bornholml, a reconnaissance
squadron, armoured battalions, artillery battal ions--most units
which are not fully manned in peacetime, (2) the Augmentation
Force—infantry companies, engineer companies, service support
units, (3) the Covering Force Reserve—armoured infantry and
artillery battalions, and (4) Other Reserve Units—mainly combat and
logistics support.
The 1973 reorganization of the Danish Army has some
limitations. The Training Force has at least in the past had a
shortage of cadre personnel and officers which delayed the buildup
of the number and composition of units as announced in 1973. The
problem was alleviated by the 1977 Agreement when the Minister of
Defense was given the authority to adjust the relative sizes of
personnel categories for example as required by technological
developments. * However, because conscripts in the Training Force
are not planned for use at mobilization, the units can devote
themselves exclusively to training the men for their assignments in
the Augmentation or the Mobilization Force. Consequently, the units
in the Training Force do reach a skill level seen as "acceptable"
with regard to expected wartime tasks.
Even so, limited training takes place at the brigade level.
Each of the five brigades participates in two large scale exercises
every year, one with the brigade somewhat reduced. These exercises
last up to 14 days. Such exercises incorporate units and
individuals from the Standing, Training, and Mobilization Forces.
Except for the months of July and August, brigade exercises take
place every month of the year.
3
^Bornholm is a Danish island in the Baltic Sea.
^Minister of Defense, Bilag 2 til Forsvarsmini sterens skrivelse af
15. marts 1977
,
Copenhagen, March 15, 1977.
3
"Dansk Brigad," Armenytt, No. 4, 1980, p. 22.
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The Field Army's budget is also insufficient for recalling
enough reservists for refresher training, exercises, and
mobilization exercises. Before 1977, the annual man-day budget for
recalling reservists was only 30,000. In 1977 it was increased to
40,000. Even so, this level only permits recall of high-priority
units, some retraining of individuals in the Mobilization Force, and
a surprise (maximum) four-day call-up of individuals assigned to the
Augmentation Force.
The increased budget allows 32,000 man-days for recalling men
in the Mobilization Force. 245,000 man-days would be required to
recall 35,000 men for seven days annually or for two weeks
biannually.l (The Mobilization Force consists of approximately
350 units of company size, each with 100 men.)
Regardless of spending levels, the Army in particular will be
in the market for new equipment over the coming years; e.g.,
armoured anti-tank vehicles and additional Leopard tanks. Two new
helicopter units are also planned for the army air arm ( Haerens
Flyvetjeneste ). 2
The Danish Home Guard is based solely on volunteerism. Most
members have no prior military service. The members sign one-year
contracts subject to termination at three months' notice. Those who
have not completed military service are obligated to 100 hours of
basic training the first year and 50 hours of advanced training
annually during the second and third years. Thereafter, a member is
under obligation to serve only 24 hours per year.
1-About 8000 man-days are used for four alarm recalls of selected
units in the Augmentation Force each year; i.e., approximately 500
men are called up for four days, four times a year. The remainder
of the man-day budget is allocated among high-priority units in the
Mobilization Force.
^"Danish Armed Forces Plan for the 1980s," International Defense
Review, no. 2, 1980, p. 167.
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Registration System *
All Danish residents are provided with a "person-number" upon
birth. This number remains unchanged throughout life. All
residents are under legal obligation to report any change in
residence—whether within the country or whether the individual
leaves Denmark—to local, civilian authorities ( Folkeregister ). If
moving within the country, each individual is required to report to
the Folkeregister in the area where he or she takes up a new
residence.
In 1968, a Centralized Personal Registration (CPR) system went
into effect. This is a form of data-collecting system using
computerized data processing. The register amasses information on
each resident including some data previously obtained from the
census. ^ At the time of writing, it is not known whether the
military has access to this system for purposes of tracing an
individual's place of residence.
When recalled for training, a reservist does not have to report
to the Folkeregister unless he gives up his residence. In other
words, a temporary absence from home because of short recalls does
not have to be reported. However, when an individual is called up
for initial, regular active duty, the temporary but extended change
of residence must be reported.
Whether he takes up his old residence or moves to a new one, it
is the responsibility of the individual to report his discharge and
civilian address to the Folkeregister within five days of discharge
from regular active duty. If he has been given a reserve
assignment, he is also expected to report any address change to his
regiment/air station either by phone or in writing.
^Unless otherwise noted, the major source for this section is
Chief of Army, Grundbog for Menige (Information for privates), No,
7, Denmark, 1976, Sees. 1.3, 2.9
?Facts about Denmark, Politikens Forlag, Copenhagen, 1972, p. 3.
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All contacts with the military after discharge from regular
active duty must go through the personnel office of the individual's
regiment/air station. All reservists are also provided with a
"soldier book" ( soldaterbogen/orlogsbogen ) containing all the
information an individual may need for reporting for reserve recall
or upon mobilization. The individual's military identification tag
is also inside the cover of this book.
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Background
The deep-rooted Prussian military tradition was shattered by
the defeat of Germany in World War II, the dissolution of the Third
German Reich, the dismemberment of the German state, and the
demilitarization that followed. Today "tradition in the Bundeswehr
(Bw; the German Armed Forces) cannot be anything except what is
justified under the Constitution. The Basic Law is the
touchstone. "*
In contrast to the other countries under discussion, the
Constitution or Basic Law of 1949 had to be amended to allow for the
development of a military. Since conscription was linked to the
establishment of a relatively large armed force, many were opposed
to this idea. The main reason given for this attitude was that
rearmament would hinder reunification of the two Germanies.
The suppression of the Hungarian revolt in 1956 by Soviet
troops improved support of the government's rearmament policy. In
that year, three important laws were passed: (1) The Soldier's Act
( Soldatengesetz ) which guaranteed full civil rights to the troops,
(2) The National Military Service Act ( Das Wehrpfl ichtgesetz ) which
IWhite Paper 1979, Bonn, September 4, 1979, Sec. 259.
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was originally presented in May 1955 and finally passed after long
and heated debate, and (3) laws regulating the term of military
service.
In the beginning, personnel for the armed forces were procured
by recruiting volunteers for three-year terms in the Army (four
years in the Air Force and Navy). In addition, 10,000 men were
drafted each quarter, initially for a period of 12 months in the
Army or the Air Force. By the end of 1956, a total of 120,000 men
were in uniform. In August 1961, the same month the Berlin Wall was
erected, the term of obligatory service was increased to 18 months.
The Bundeswehr (Bw) was created in an environment where the
general population was not favorable to people in uniform. The
slogan among many young Germans was " Ohne mich " (without me). The
new Army had to represent a clear break with the past, win the
confidence of the German people, and establish the proper
relationship between soldiers and their military superiors because
the traditional "iron discipline" was inconsistent with the newly
proclaimed status of the "citizen in uniform".
The concept used to promote these goals was initially called
Innere Geftlge (internal structure) later changed to Innere
Ftlhrung (leadership and civic education). " Innere Ftlhrung has
its roots in the Constitution and in military law. It embraces the
basic concept underlying the relations between the armed forces, the
State, and society at large, and it also included the guidelines and
rules of behavior governing relations between superiors and
subordinates.... The idea of the 'citizen in uniform 1 holds
incontestable sway in the Bundeswehr . " Orientation about Innere
Ftlhrung is given to commanders, general staff officers, and
officers and NCOs. The school providing such training is also
responsible for public information work and for fostering contact
with the armed forces of other countries.
*
JWhite Paper 1979, Bonn, September 4, 1979, Sees. 244-245.
31
General unrest and dissatisfaction with society as a whole
started to spread in 1967.1 j ne height of student unrest occurred
in 1969 but culminated in 1972-73. This dissatisfaction also
affected the Bw, focusing on (1) inequity in conscription because
increasing age cohorts decreased universality, (2) recruitment
problems in the officer corps, and (3) the training burden resulting
from conscription of a large proportion of each age cohort.
The equity problem associated with compulsory military service
had become so pronounced by the early 1970s that a special
commission was established to investigate the problem and to explore
alternative ways to achieve greater equity. 2 its first report,
Equity in Conscription in the Federal Republic of Germany , was
presented in 1971. The Commission noted that the number of men
liable for military service would increase relative to manpower
requirements, and hence, equity in conscription could not be
achieved. Furthermore, the target ratio of volunteers to concripts
was unlikely to be met in the future due to social conditions and
the situation in the labor market.
The Commission recommended policies to ameliorate the
inequities in conscription without moving to an all -volunteer force.
In line with these recommendations, then Minister of Defense, Helmut
Schmidt proposed in 1971 to raise the Bw strength to 500,000 from
that level at which it was frozen in 1967 (460,000). This
recommendation was less for reasons of combat effectiveness than for
social justice. He also suggested that the length of regular active
duty be reduced from 18 to 15 months and that military pay to
volunteers at all levels be made equivalent to that given to
civilian counterparts. In 1972 the length of regular active duty
was reduced to its current level of 15 months.
J White Paper 1975/76 , Bonn, January 20, 1976, Sec. 283.
^The Force Structure Commission of the Government of the Federal
Republic of Germany.
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The Force Structure Commission was also tasked with developing
a new force structure for the end of the 1 970 ' s . The Commission's
second report in 1972 recommended a reorganization of the Army from
33 to 36 brigades.^
Manpower Procurement Policies ^
Compulsory military service now involves 15 months of regular
active duty. Of the overall personnel strength of the armed
services (495,000), conscripts constitute less than 50 percent and a
little over 50 percent in the Army. The manpower flows through the
West German ground forces are shown in Fig. 8.
Males are eligible for conscription upon reaching age 18. In
1975, the average age of a conscript upon induction was 20.1 years,
and the average time between school -leaving and entering military
service was four years and four months. Consequently, upon
induction most conscripts hold final certificates of vocational
training. In 1975, only ten percent (including school, college, and
university students) had no vocational certificate. Even so,
conscripts are generally trained for less complex tasks because the
rapid technological development of military equipment has increased
the need for long-term personnel. To fill positions requiring more
specialized training, the Bw now uses what is called "term-
personnel" ( Soldat auf Zeit )3. Approximately 58 percent of each
age cohort complete regular active duty in the military. ^
I fhe Force Structure in the Federal Republic of Germany: Analysis
and Options.
2White Paper 1979 , op.cit., Sees. 272, 289-294.
^Conscripts with 15 months service may fill positions up to and
including lower grade corporal ( Unteroffizier ). Only those with
minimum two years service ( Soldat auf Zeit ) fill positions from
higher grade corporal ( Stabsunteroff izier ), sergeant ( Feldwebel ),
and up.
^Letter and comments on earlier version of manuscript from 0TL





































































From 1976 to 1979, the margin between effective and authorized
strengths has narrowed, and the manpower situation is balanced so
far as regular servicemen are concerned. A shortage of short-
service volunteers on 3 to 12 year contracts (8.7 percent under
authorized strength) has been offset by utilizing civilian personnel
and conscripts. There is a surplus of short-service volunteers on
two year contracts.
The annual surplus of young men eligible for induction will
increase until 1983, but from 1988 onward a deficit will develop.
Consequently, the Bundeswehr has looked for ways to offset this
deficit, one of which is an expanded use of women volunteers.
At the beginning of each quarter, approximately 44,000 men are
called up for basic training in the Army (the Field Army and the
Territorial Army). Their service begins with three months in
training units. Following this, they receive twelve months'
post-basic training with an operational element. About one fourth
of the conscripts in operational Field Army formations is replaced
each quarter with fresh personnel. Civilian personnel number
180,000 or 27 percent of total defense manpower J
Peacetime and Wartime Ground Force Structure ^
The West German Army consists of the Field Army, which is
transferred to NATO command in wartime, and the Territorial Army,
which remains under national command.
1 Ibid, Sec 311.
^Major sources: (1
)
Pie neue Struktur des Heeres , Press release,
Ministry of Defense, Bonn, November 7, 1978, (2) Interviews, Ministry
of Defense, Joint Staff/Organization (FU S IV 2) , Bonn, 22-23
September 1980, (3) "Ny vclsttyska armeorganisati on," Armenyt
t
,
Sweden, March 1979, pp. 16-18, and (4) Letters and comments from 0TL
i.G. Gerhard Ludwig, Ministry of Defense (FU S IV 2), Bonn,
November 1978 through December 1980.
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On November 6, 1979— as a result of approximately six years of
analysis and experimentation—the West Germans decided to adopt a
new Army structure called Heeresmodell 4 (Army Structure 4). Table
2 provides an overview of the organization, the readiness, and the
strength of the new German Army.
The basic organization above the brigade level will be
maintained; i.e. the three corps and the 12 divisions from
Heeresmodell 3 . Eleven of the twelve divisions are distributed
among the three corps, while the 6th armoured infantry division in
Schleswig-Holstein, together with Danish units, is assigned to the
NATO command covering the Baltic approaches (BALTAP).
The airborne division has a particular status in that its three
brigades are divided among the three corps and has a peacetime staff
primarily responsible for unified training.
It is expected that the reorganization will be completed by
mid-1980's.
Field Army : The Field Army can be described at three
organizational levels: Corps, division, and brigade.
(1) Each corps staff can command up to five divisions. In
addition, two basic unit types outside the divisional structure are
assigned to each corps and are under the command of the corps
commander at all times; KorpsverfOgungstruppen and Korpsversor-
gungstruppen . The Korpsverfflgungstruppen include reconnaissance,
and communication units as well as combat support units like
artillery and air-defense. In Heeresmodell 4 each corps will also
be assigned an anti-tank helicopter regiment, each equipped with 56
helicopters. The air-defense battalions will be reorganized into
air defense regiments equipped with missiles (ROLAND II).
36
Table 2







3 corps with combat- and support units
12 divisions with combat- and support units, of which:
11 divisions are distributed among the 3 corps, and
1 division (6th armoured infantry division in Schleswig-
Holstein) is assigned to BALTAP
36 brigades, of which:
17 armoured (Panzer )
15 armoured infantry (Panzergrenadier )
1 light infantry mountain ( Gebirgsjager )
3 airborne (Luftlande)
In addition:
Operational- and training units (Einsatz- und Ausbildungs-
Einheiten) where new enlistees and conscripts are placed
initially for six weeks to three months.
Upon mobilization, there are:
Replacement battalions (Wehrleit/Ersatzbatallione ) where
approximately 50 percent of the reservists are assigned.
Here they are brought to the division or brigade level
where they are kept in Field Replacement battalions
( Feldersatzbattalione) until needed for replacement.
Readiness:
The 36 brigades are manned at 90 percent in peacetime,
corresponding to NATO's highest readiness category, A 1.
Men with less than three months training will be replaced by
trained reservists in stand-by readiness.
Strength:








3 Territorial commands: North, South, and Schleswig-Holstein
5 Local defense districts (Wehrbereichskommandos , WBK)
28 Local defense regions (Verteidigungsbezirkkommandos , VBK)




27 brigade-equivalents, of which:
6 Home Defense Brigades (Heimatschutzbrigaden ) similar
to armoured infantry brigades
6 Heavy Home Defense Brigades (Heimatschutzbrigaden / equipment
holding units) similar to armoured infantry brigades
15 Home Defense Regiments (Heimatschutzregimenter ) formed




6 Heimatschutzbrigaden , of which:
4 at 65 percent strength in peacetime and
1 at 52 percent,
1 at 85 percent,
corresponding to NATO's readiness level B 1. Remainder is
mainly equipment-holding units. Some may require post-
mobilization training, however, most are mobilizable within
M + 3 days
.
Strength:
Peacetime 65 , 000
Mobilizable 445,000
Total Wartime 510,000
WARTIME POTENTIAL OF THE GERMAN ARMY: close to 950,000, of which
approximately 65 percent is mobilizable.
(Total wartime potential of the Bundeswehr is approximately 1,250,000)
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(2) With the exception of the airborne, all divisions in the
new model will include one air-defense regiment each equipped with
armoured anti-aircraft vehicles (36 GEPARDS). The 6th division in
Schleswig-Holstein, which is not assigned to one of the corps
commands and therefore cannot be supported by the corps' anti-tank
helicopter regiments, will be provided with its own anti-tank
helicopter battalion. The divisions' armoured reconnaissance
battalions will also receive better equipment.
(3) The number of brigades will be increased from 33 to 36.
Two armoured infantry brigades will be upgraded to armoured
brigades, and the existing (light infantry) Jclgerbrigade and one
Gebirgs jclgerbrigade will be upgraded to armoured infantry
brigades. Only one Gebi rgsjciger-brigade will remain.
1
In the original Heeresmodell 4 each brigade was supposed to
consist of four armoured or armoured infantry brigades rather than
the three in Heeresmodell 3 . However, because of the investment
expenditures required to implement this reorganization, two
alternatives were explored: (1) retain the three-battalion
structure, and (2) maintain three standing ( prclsente ) battalions
and one cadre- or reserve/mobilization battalion.
The result was a compromise. As shown in Figure 9, in
peacetime each brigade will consist of three battalions, each with
four companies as well as expanded (+) staffs and support. In
wartime, each brigade will consist of four battalions, each with
three combat companies. The fourth battalion will be created by
transferring one company from each of the three peacetime battalions
as well as personnel from the expanded peacetime staffs and support
companies.
^Originally it was intended to transform all lightly equipped
units to armoured infantry units. However, at a later time it was
decided that it was still necessary to maintain units trained in
mountain combat. Because of insufficient exercise areas in the
mountains and because of resistance on the part of the local




















































The airborne brigades will already in peacetime consist of four
battalions each with three companies.
When changing from the peace- to wartime organization,
manpower with less than three months training will be replaced by
trained reservist. Peacetime exercises take place with the wartime
organization.
In peacetime, the 36 brigades will be manned at 90 percent of
wartime levels; corresponding to NATO's highest readiness category
of "A 1".
A special reserve status is held by approximately 18,600 men
in VerfUgungsbereitschaft (stand-by reserves). These men who are
in this status for maximum 12 months after discharge from active
duty, are formed into fully equipped active units or will be used to
replace men with less than three months training. The number will
be increased from 18,600 to approximately 40,000 within the next
three to four years.
Territorial Army : In the new Heeresmodell 4 , shown in Fig.
10, the six Heimatschutzbrigaden (Home Defense Brigades) which up
till now corresponded to lightly equipped infantry brigades and
only were assigned rear area defense tasks, are upgraded to
correspond to armoured infantry brigades and will be equipped with
tanks. Their mission will be to support Field Army units in
forward defense ( Vorneverteidigung ) as well as to perform the
earlier rear area defense tasks. Four brigades will be manned in
peacetime at 65 percent, one at 52 percent, and one at 85 percent,
corresponding to NATO readiness category "B l".*
Iwhen Heeresmodell 4 was adopted in November 1979, six of the 12
Heimatschutzbrigaden were named Heimatschutzkommandos and six were
named Schwere Heimatschutzregimenter . However, at a later time
they were renamed.
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The six Heimatschutzbrigaden will remain mainly as equipment
holding units. However, their equipment will be upgraded and the
units will also correspond to armoured infantry brigades.
Even the local defense Sicherungstruppen will be reorganized.
Instead of the 27 partly motorized Sicherungsbatal 1 ionen in
Heeresmodell 3 , there will be 45 completely motorized
Heimatschutzbatal 1 ionen (Home Defense battalions) organized into 15
Heimatschutzregimenter (Home Defense regiments).
The 150 completely motorized Heimatschutzkompanien (Home
Defense companies) are assigned defense of civilian targets which
may be of interest to the military ( Objektschutz ).
The number of Sicherungszugen (platoons), tasked with defending
depots, airfields, etc., will be increased from 120 to 300. All of
these are mobilization or equipment-holding units in peacetime.
Reserve Training : In the Field Army, there are reserve
training spaces ( Wehrtlbungsplcltze ) designated solely for
recalling reservists. In 1980, there were on the average 7000 of
these spaces corresponding to more than 2.5 million reserve
man-days. This number represents an increase of approximately 17
percent from earlier years. The Territorial Army will also increase
reserve training. Consequently, there is a need for additional
training areas, and about 1900 new areas will be built; bringing the
total to 5900.
Registration System *
It has been politically infeasible to assign all German
residents with a person- or identification-number. However, all
l-Major sources: (1) Interviews, Ministry of Defense, Staff,
Department of Management and Justice/Conscription (VR III 7), Bonn,
24 September, 1980, (2) "Melderechtsrahmengesetz, " (Registration
Laws of 16 August 1980), Bundesgesetzbl att , Teil I, Nr. 50, 1980,








































































































































































































E •H 4-1 ft
•P > 3 a>
4-1 h T3 TJ
0) 0)
U cn 0) U-l
cd c cu >
0) h •H
ft -H 4-1 a)
4-1 H o cn
c cd CD cd c
•H N rf3 0)
rt 4J B M-l
0) rH 01












































































































O T3U C2 fd . o
^ 4-1
T3 - .
c --* cn cn
fd cn o 4-)
cn cd c
M QJ LT) 3
QJ >i rH
U G






























T3 tJ ft cn
CD -H -H
OJ 4-> !-l >
> 03 O U
•h -H cn Q)
4-> rH e cn
U G O QJ






































































residents must report address-changes to local, civilian authorities
( Gemei ndebehtirden ) who are in charge of the registers
(Melderegister ). Address changes are reported to the military by
the civilian authorities.
A law of 16 August 1980 ( Melderechtsrahmengesetz ) serves as the
legal framework for the pertaining laws of the Lender for the
national registration system. Local authorities are obligated to
keep records (Melderegister ) of all residents in their area. The
data contained in the Melderegister are family name, earlier names,
first name, academic degrees, aliases, birthdate, birthplace, sex,
employed/not employed, basic information on legal guardian,
citizenship, formal religious membership, present and former
address, major and subsidiary residence, date of entry and exit into
the region, marital status, basic information on spouse, basic
information on children under legal age, date and place of
identitycard/passport, and if relevant, date and place of death.
Military and civil defense authorities have limited access-
as spelt out in the law--to the information in the Melderegister and
solely on those individuals under military obligation and to the
degree the respective authorities need the information to perform
their duty.
When the storing of information on an individual is no longer
required by law, or if inadmissible information is stored, it must
be destroyed.
By law, all German residents (except, for example, diplomatic
personnel) must report address changes. Call-up for regular or
reserve military service does not have to be reported. Voluntary,
military personnel do not have to report temporary duty absences
unless longer than three months.
At the age of 18, all young men are liable for military service
and are requested to report for classification by the local
authorities (Lclnderbehttrden).
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A reservist is requested to report all moves or job changes to
military authorities. However, there exists no institutionalized
registration system for updating either addresses or functional
assignments on a regular basis. The military registration system is
computerized, however, the civilian system is not yet computerized.
The 18,600 reservists in VerfUgungsbereitschaft (stand-by
reserves) must report even a contemplated move; i.e., these
reservists are under obligation to keep the military authorities
( Wehrersatzbehtirden ) at all times informed about their address.
Since no civilian identification number exists, all military
personnel are assigned a soldier-number. This number, used solely
by the military, consists of birthdate (six digits), first initial
in the last name, a geographic region code (three digits), a
serial number ( Zflhlnummer/laufende Nummer ), and finally, a single
digit computer code. This soldier-number stays with an individual
throughout the military obligation.
While on regular active duty, each soldier is also assigned one
or several functional codes depending on the function(s) he is able
to fill. This number is referred to as the Ausbildungs-und
Tcltigkeit Nummer (ATN; educati onal /traini ng and functional
number). There are several hundred functional categories, each
having an eight-digit code. The ATN is normally never changed.
Civilian training received after discharge from regular active
duty will rarely result in changing an individual's ATN. Only if
requested or if given additional military training because of
shortages in critical skills, may the ATN be changed. Certain
civilian professional qualifications may also lead to a change in




Conscription has a long history in Norway. The Constitution of
1814, paragraph 109, assumed universal, compulsory service; however,
inductions were for a long time limited to people from the
countryside. In 1854 compulsory military service was introduced to
include all men in a certain age category from both the cities and
the countryside. The possibility to pay someone else to serve was
limited. In 1876 a law on compulsory service was passed which
eliminated the possibility of paying for a replacement. In 1897
conscription was extended to include also those living in North
Norway.
Not all eligible males were inducted, and selection was done by
lottery. However, in 1910 a new law was passed which no longer
permitted selection by lottery.
After World War I, the trust in the League of Nations, the
Norwegian neutrality policy, and the general environment of
disarmament led to a rather drastic reduction in the armed services.
Only about half of those eligible were inducted, and a progressive
defense tax was imposed on those not having to serve. Selection was
mainly done by setting strict physical standards.*
The existence of Norwegian troops created at home and abroad
during World War II, eased the conversion from war to peace. The
question of Norwegian participation in the occupation of Germany
came up in 1946, and in 1947 the Parliament agreed that Norway,
beginning in the spring of 1947, should station a brigade of 4000
J Verneplikt
,
N0U 1979:51 (Report by the Committee on
Conscription), Oslo, July 18, 1979, Sec. 5.1.
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men (mainly conscripts) in the zone occupied by the British. This
arrangement lasted until 1953, when the need to redeploy these
forces to Norwegian territory became apparent.
1
The Norwegian system of conscription, therefore, is based on
tradition and is supported by the Constitution, but it also reflects
the experiences of World War II. It is seen as natural and
acceptable and is regarded as a democratic form of building defense.
Even so, the system is debated, with more selective conscription
mixed with increased use of long-term volunteers as one
alternative.
The Norwegian age cohorts are relatively small compared to the
size of the wartime force. Therefore, there is little possibility
of increasing force size by increasing the number of men inducted,
rather the present wartime force is maintained by retaining men in
reserve status for a prolonged period of time.
While the Norwegian wartime Army is by far the largest in NATO
relative to the population base, there are complaints about the
quality of equipment and about standing readiness. * The Defense
Review Commission of 1974 suggested in their 1978 report that the
standing and two mobilization brigades be changed from infantry to
armoured brigades and that some mobilization units be replaced with
standing units.
3
iMajor General Bj0rn Christophersen, Forsvarets plass i norsk
historie
,
Forsvarets Krigshistoriske Avdeling, Oslo, 1971, pp.
63-68.
^Fully mobilized, the Norwegian wartime forces constitute more
than seven percent of the population. Corresponding figures for
Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and
the United States are approximately 3.7, 2.7, 1.0 and 1.3. Outside
NATO, the Swedish wartime armed forces constitute about 10 percent
of the population, and the Israeli more than 11 percent of the total
population (note: only Jews and Druses are under military
obligation; Muslims and Christian Arabs may apply to join as
volunteers).




The major manpower procurement method in Norway is
conscription, and the policy is likely to continue. Because of the
need for a large defense effort relative to the population base,
universal conscription is approximated. About two-thirds of each
male cohort complete first-term regular active duty in one of the
armed services, but about 90 percent perform some function within
Total Defense.
Fig. 11 shows the manpower flows through the Norwegian ground
forces.
Males are under military obligation from age 19 until 45. 1 If
the country is threatened by war or is at war, men are under
military obligation until age 55. Men ages 45 to 55 may also be
under peacetime obligation for special Home Guard duty or in other
Total Defense functions. Both men and women ages 18 to 65 may be
required to serve in Civil Defense.
2
The length of compulsory service is at all times determined by
the Storting (Parliament) and has been changed several times since
World war II. Currently, first-term regular active duty in the
Army, the Air Artillery, and the Coastal Artillery is 12 months, and
15 months in the Air Force and in the Navy. The shorter term in the
Army is offset by more reserve recalls. Exceptions to these terms
are made when required to ensure obvious educational and other
military requirements and to encourage voluntary enlistment which is
compensated with higher rank and better economic compensation and
fringe benefits.
Mn 1946, the minimum age was lowered from 21 to 20 years, and in
1977 a gradual lowering to 19 was implemented.











































































Due to technological developments, requirements for skilled
manpower have increased. The age cohorts currently eligible for
induction have received better vocational training prior to military
service than earlier. * Therefore, improved methods of utilizing
manpower have been implemented. Previous civilian qualifications,
competence, and wishes are taken into consideration.
2
As mentioned, Army conscripts are initially drafted to 12
months regular active duty. Those who volunteer for NCO training
receive sergeants rank and pay after 12 months theoretical and
practical training, and are obligated to serve an additional 12
months.
Before 1969, the Army followed a 3+3+6 training pattern for all
conscripts; i.e., 3 months basic training, 3 months unit training, 6
months in a standing unit. However, since 1969 it has been
impossible to man all standing units with this pattern, and the Army
changed to a 3+9 pattern; i.e., 3 months in basic training followed
by 9 months in a standing unit. Those requiring specialty training
may follow the old 3+3+6 pattern; i.e., three months basic training
is followed by three months speciality training before transfer to a
standing unit.
After the regular active duty period, conscripts are first
assigned to the Mobilization Field Army until age 34 and thereafter
to the Local Defense Force until age 45.
The refresher training pattern (amount and frequency) is also
determined by the Storting . In 1980, the total annual man-day
budget for recalling reservists in the Field Army and Local Defense
Force, was approximately 310,000. The men in the "average"
mobilization field unit are recalled 21 to 30 days every four years,
Ministry of Defense, Tjenestetiden i Forsvaret , NOU 1972:32,
Oslo, 1972, p. 73.
^This concept of "matching" civilian skills and qualifications
with military requirements is known in Scandinavia as "the right man
for the right job."
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those in high priority field units, 21 to 30 days every three years.
Because all conscripts do not serve the same number of days, Norway
in effect operates under a system of differentiated length of
obligatory service depending on the complexity or priority of the
function. On the average, obligatory regular and reserve active
duty for Army privates total 468 days, for specialists, 510 days.
However, many conscripts volunteer for duty beyond the minimum
obligation.
Enlisted volunteers serve a limited role in the Norwegian armed
forces. With some exception, men who enlist voluntarily sign up for
non-terminable three-year contracts. Reenlistment may take place
twice, but not after they turn 34 years old. This policy has not
been very successful or extensive. Mainly functions which provide
civilian sector competence have been completely filled. The
shortfall elsewhere has been partly offset by the improved quality
of conscripts upon induction. Approximately ninety percent of
reserve officers and NCOs are in conscript status. However, as will
be discussed later, these have more than 12 months military
training.
The lack of volunteers may result from more than 60 percent of
all young men being drafted giving them a sense of having fulfilled
their obligation. Given the incentives and the conditions of
military service in Norway (North Norway being the most
strategically exposed region and where the major part of the
standing Army is deployed), the civilian sector may look more
attractive than military service. The use of long-term volunteers
would involve bringing families into North Norway where the economic
and social infrastructure is minimal and where the climate and
daylight conditions are rather extreme.
Voluntary enlistment has not been as cost-saving as initially
expected. With the current incentive system, the available pool is
small and not of desired quality, the educational opportunities used
to induce volunteers has decreased the effective service time, and
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there have been demands—partially met--by this group for shorter
workday /week, longer vacations, greater fringe benefits, etc. To a
great extent, these factors also apply to conscripts resulting in
increased cost per effective man-hour.
Peacetime and Wartime Ground Force Structure ^
As mentioned, Norway's defense task is large relative to its
population base; consequently, Norway has relied heavily on
mobilization forces throughout the postwar period. Conscription,
combined with the mobilization emphasis, is seen to provide good use
of the nation's defense potential. The Total Defense concept,
covering both military and non-military (civil defense, economic and
psychological preparedness, police, civilian administrative
authorities, etc.) defense, yields quantitative strength in case of
war, prepares the country for other external pressures and crises
like cut-off of vital imports, and limits the effort required in
peacetime.
In contrast to the Danish system, the Norwegian demographic
characteristics and the vulnerability of the communications system
have made it necessary to organize the standing force into one
complete basic operational unit (BOU); i.e., an infantry brigade.
This brigade and smaller units, a total of 6500 men, are at all
times deployed to the sparsely populated and strategically
vulnerable North Norway.
North Norway is divided into four army districts under the
Commander Allied Forces North Norway (C0MN0N). The defense
districts are composed of standing forces, mobilization units, and
Home Guard units. In addition, the 6th Division, a mobile division
headquarters designed to command three to five brigades, is situated
*The Norwegian ground force structure, mobilization planning, and
reserve training are discussed in great detail in: Ragnhild
Sohlberg, Defense Manpower Policy Analysis: NATO Ground Forces
,
P-6532, The Rand Corporation, June 1980.
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in North Norway. The largest unit in the standing force in North
Norway is the standing brigade (BRIG N) deployed in Troms County.
This brigade is situated in three main garrisons.
*
The major features of the wartime organization are shown in
Table 3. In contrast to Denmark, Norway has only one type of BOU.
The infantry brigade, shown in Fig. 12, consists of approximately
5500 men organized as follows:
Command : Staff, headquarters company, military police platoon,
signal company.
Maneuver units : Three infantry battalions, armoured
reconnaissance company (cavalry).
Tactical support units : Artillery battalion, heavy mortar
infantry company, anti-tank platoon, light air defense battery,
engineer company.
Administrative support companies : Transport, supply, supply
and maintenance, medical.
In addition, there are support units organically outside the
brigade structure--e.g. , armour, artillery, supply—assigned to the
division command (3 to 5 brigades) according to availability and
need.
As shown in Table 3, the Field Army consists of 12 infantry
brigades, of which only one is standing. The remainder are
mobilization brigades. Approximately 15 percent of the officers and
NCOs are full-time professionals, normally assigned to Headquarters,
Ministry of Defense, schools, and regiments in peacetime. The
remainder, 85 percent of officers and NCOs, as well as all privates
are reservists.







/-*> 0) ft) «H * 1o c II rH ino o d 4J = rH eno •H •H • tO
* tH m P d u co ^^o id to 0) o ft) ft> K











Q) 43 v^ h •H •V to 1 ^
a >s O) « r4 to Ss •3 O
m rS tH d to a 4J td Vi O
o • • rH tH 0) o co P. •3 tO o
Ui CO tH tO 60 o d •H 3 *
4J to u 55 o M CM o sr
o •H CJ o) 'd a U SO
en d
s
d d T3 to + Q) v^
c 3 • O) CM d co d g
0) to o = tO -H o X o
U* d *J 1 o w
o O -rl •• 1 to u
^^ a •H C 4-> • ^ U ft) »3 • • + +o 4-» 3 d
pj ftl T3 ft) CO sixo tH flj Ol o d 60 too 3 N M I 8< •H -H M ft) ft)* o •h o> «M rt
U-l g
CO d ao o tH iH o CUTS 45 •H M
en J •H tH tH •H tH O ft) , O •3 o
tH 43 tO a 3 0) u CO rt Ut
s-^ 5 B oi 0"«H ft) •H a) ^-*
o»
S to « w u
^rS Q Pi O) oto o
o 4-1 4J d o
H 1 ft) •








O £ 0) o tH • 4-1 cn tH•H .* >» n to to • a) i CO rt4J 4J M tH td a 4J iH O t>s o
ta ^N C rt iH •H «H CO to CM ta o
N o to E tO •3 w d d ft) "3 r-3
•H o U-l • u o a) d 3 O P. 0) •
tH o c to to o t^ « •H ft) CM CO + +
go
•rt »*. •H 4J ftl rH o •3 to tO 60 60 ft)
43 o •H rH •H CO co d tO + *a ftl
O r>» rH C 10 *o P. ft) ft) -H ta £UJ X "^y tH 3 0) O) ft) n d U-i M A X 60
<_) *o to *3 O «H O 3 to •H ft)
q: ft) M tO -H *3 M *3 4-1 r4 CO
o B
• • q) 60 tO ft) ^ to ' P. P. •• »o ft) ^
u_ 0) tH •H U 43 tO ft) ft) •H •3 PS O
d 4J tH U tH M r{ W • r4 ft) r^ o
Ul CO •H rt 43 CM O •H m c) io U r*> 4J >% o
z: a) C g >«• 4-1 g 60 tH 43 H to O «H oi—
i
«J 3 0) sr •H d > o> d tH M
h- >> U W «H >> O) O o P. O < t**
o; !» C *3 3 Ol »3 H W rl CJ ft) «H N-X< O C se
*3 d Ol tH U-l *3 r4 »3
f*1 3 i-i •H tO d •• to 4J O) U-t •3 P. tH
< 4-1 d o •H 4-1 4J to o ft) •3 1 ft)
ft1 >- tO CO 0) z tO d to g *3 60 d 45 •H







O o> tH tO o z P CJ 0.43 43 >»45 + + oo •H •H 60 rH 'O •H 4J H -H ft) CJ •3 o
go o u. 43 >H P. rl ft) ft) 3 P. CO CO CD rt m 00 •
— m O M ft) O 4= ft) tr o P. 0} ft) •H ft) o 4J CM


















O Q) o S5 d • d tO 4J d oO n ft) tH •H CO o U CO •H Oo to *o a *3 rt d JS CO •3 O
CO a to a> c u o tH Ol d
%»• 01 60
M «H








01 p. n d to d u d 4-1 OT rH
o ^43 O) t-i *H d o • td •
M g • O) 3 to 60 60 a b
o (0 >N >* U CO 14-1 M > "3 d •
Ul CO u o to •H H ft) • CO 0) •H >• <u
Ol 4-1
m ti
u-i o> d p. CO 4-1 d cd u
60 c c U-t o o 4-1 « ft) •H •3 u
C •H rt • vo o O -H -H •3 O CO tH rt 1 o
•H •[)•«« 55 UJ 4-1 o) rt 4-1 CU y> 53 u
•a tO C *-l tH U-t to 4-1 J-l P. g 4-1
c Ol «H «H •• d rt O N CO 4J •H O 3
o n d 4J V4 d -h •h d J-t U o •• g
4J tH 3 d oi O 4J tH tH O V •H to •H
in 60 0) JC •H P.-H d o (0 0) to CO 4J
.d W RS tfl tH. 43 ft) d > rt ftl M•SH .. 01 W r-t O 14 o rt 43 d rt
T3 CO tH o o • Ol O g > rt CJ 45 -H
cPC UH tH 55 Uh to ft) ftl • •3
tO *H tO cx o d u U-l >» ** o to rt
4-» d B O) o u o o 1 O 45 o oi






































2 co CO /» f
55
However, both because they have longer military obligation than
the other ranks and because they often volunteer for extra training,
all reserve officers have much more than 12 months military
training. Many are also former full-time professional officers who
obtain conscript ( vernepliktig ) status upon return to civilian life
if this return takes place before the legal retirement age.
The peacetime organization of the Mobilization Force
(Mobilization Field Army and Local Defense) consists of regiments.
These regiments are administrative and caretaker units organized
according to weapons. The wartime organization of the Mobilization
Force draws units from the various reg1ments--e.g. , infantry
battalions from Infantry regiments, artillery battalions from
artillery regiments.
The number of full-time personnel in a regiment ranges between
40 and 50, approximately half of them civilians. The conscripts in
the wartime units are drawn from the local population. Infantry
regiments draw personnel from smaller areas than artillery
regiments. Because the artillery units have more complex tasks,
they recruit from a larger population base to get the best qualified
personnel
.
All 12 Field Army brigades are similarly organized and
equipped. When the standing brigade receives new equipment or
weapons, this is also procured for the mobilization brigades.
Because trained personnel may not be immediately available in
mobilization units, new equipment is phased 1n gradually as
conscripts are transferred from the standing force or as reservists
are retrained.
One of the high-priority mobilization brigades in South Norway
is earmarked for early reinforcement of North Norway and has "dual
based" equipment; i.e., this brigade has access to training
equipment in South Norway as well as to another set prestocked in
North Norway. The long-range planning goal is to prestock equipment
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for additional brigades in this sensitive northern area while
ensuring that these units also have a complete set locally in the
mobilization area in case a transfer is undesirable or
impossible. 1
Brigade-level exercises take place at least twice a year, often
in association with a full-scale airlift of one mobilization brigade
from South to North Norway. During recent years, this transfer has
taken place in association with NATO exercises which incorporate the
Norwegian standing brigade, allied troops, and a Norwegian
mobilization brigade--a total of about 15,000 troops. 2 These high
priority exercises consume a substantial portion of the annual
man-day budget for refresher training, leaving little for lower
priority units.
The Local Defense Force, organized into battalions and smaller
units, generally inherits equipment from the Field Army.
Consequently, older personnel are familiar with the equipment and
require little retraining. The emphasis during recalls, therefore,
is on training skills and on exercises.
Like Denmark, Norway has a Home Guard. Recruitment is based on
both conscription and volunteerism; however, most of the Home Guard
members are under compulsory military obligation and have completed
regular active duty in one of the armed services. The members are
obligated to serve 50 hours or 6 days per year. The most commonly
observed training pattern consists of one continuous week every
J Forsvarskommisjonen av 1974
,
op. cit., Sec. 21.4.38.
2A unique feature shared by Denmark and Norway is the attitude
toward foreign bases and nuclear weapons. During the postwar
period, as part of the general Nordic Balance , both countries
adopted the policy of neither permitting foreign troops to be
stationed on their soil in peacetime nor nuclear facilities to be
established. However, preparations may be made in peacetime for
receiving foreign troops in case of crisis. The Nordic Balance
involves NATO membership for Denmark, Norway, and Iceland, and
non-alignment for Sweden and Finland; Finland having a treaty of
friendship and mutual assistance with the Soviet Union.
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year. Officers and specialists are obligated to serve an additional
14 days every three years. In 1980, the reserve budget for the Home
Guard was 297,000 man-days. It is expected that the majority of the
Home Guard can be mobilized within hours. Units in North Norway are
equipped with anti-tank weapons.
Registration System *
Like all Scandinavian countries, Norway assigns person-numbers
to all residents upon birth. This number includes birthdate, a
birthplace code, and a male/female code. Regardless of residence,
this number remains unchanged—even if moving abroad.
Immediately after a change of residence, all residents are
legally obligated to report to the local authorities ( Folkeregister )
in the area they move to. If they plan to leave the country and
take up residence temporarily or permanently abroad, this must be
reported to the authorities where they reside, in order to get a
"sailing permit."
All Norwegians under military obligation are assigned an
identification number which does not currently correspond to or
incorporate the person-number. There exists no political or legal
obstacles for making these numbers identical. However, in spite of
a desire to change the current system, funds have been lacking.
Consequently, an address change reported to the Folkeregister is not
automatically provided to the mi litary--even though the military
have access to the Folkeregister for tracing individuals. 2
^Unless otherwise noted, Interview, Norwegian Defense
Headquarters, Army Staff, Oslo, 19 September 1980.
^In Sweden, a resident filling out his Folkeregister form must
check off whether or not he is under military obligation. If he is,
then one copy is automatically sent to the military authorities.
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All individuals under military obligation are obligated to keep
their units informed about any change in residence, occupation, or
health status. If planning to travel abroad, emmigrate or take a
job on a merchant ship sailing only on foreign ports, they must
apply to their units for permission.
1
In addition to this obligatory reporting system, the Norwegian
military has an annual registration system for updating the
information on all individuals under military obligation. Forms,
sent out each January, request information on address, occupation,





In the 18th Century, Britain only had a small army. From 1688
to 1792 Roman Catholics were barred from service, so Ireland was not
yet the recruiting ground she became at a later date. By 1802 the
military force under central command numbered approximately
151,0004 .
The army was isolated from society, but this was not viewed as
a bad thing. Neither France nor Prussia seemed to offer attractive
models for the close integration of army and society to a people
that wished to remain "free and unfettered."
^Inspector General of the Army, Handbok for soldaten: Haeren ,
(Soldier's Handbook: The Army), UD 17-1, Fabritius & Sinner,
Oslo, 1973, p. 155.
2For further details, see Sohlberg (1980), Chapter IV.
3Unless otherwise noted, for the period up to 1939, the major
source is: John Gooch, Armies in Europe , Routledge & Keagan Paul,
London, 1980, pp. 18, 45-47, 78, 81, 119-120, 188-189, 216-220.
^Sir J. W. Fortescue, History of the British Army.
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Between 1859 and 1879, the armies of all the major states in
Europe clashed in wars. By this time, the British army was one of
the least modern in Western Europe. The army in India was a potent
but not always successful force*. Out of these experiences came
European ideas about the size, organization, and structure of
armies; focused around a peacetime army ready for war.
Because Britian's troops had to cope with the control of an
empire, it was virtually impossible for her to introduce large
armies manned by short-service conscripts. There were fears about
putting arms into the hands of "unreliable groups. "2 Also, there
was no tradition of conscription and little likelihood of its being
introduced. The British were also fearful about a large standing
(permanent) army, a fear that was a major factor in deterring army
size and, hence, the reductions which followed every war since
1660^. However, attempts were made to improve the quality of the
army by making soldiering a respectable profession and by improving
pay and conditions of service. The Army Enlistment Act of 1870
reduced service from twenty to twelve years, half of which was spent
in reserve status. The Territorial Force succeeded the Volunteer
Force in 1908 and became the Territorial Army in 19204 .
By the end of 1914, military set-backs during World War I
significantly reduced the effectiveness of the Regular Army. The
gap was initially filled by the Territorials as well as those who
enlisted in 1914. In planning the 1916 campaign, it became apparent
that the flow of volunteers into the Army would be insufficient to
satisfy the requirement for 1.5 million men. It was slowly accepted
^Comments on paper by Mr. J. Pitt-Brooke, Defence Secretariat 14
(Service Personnel), Ministry of Defence, London, January 1981.
^This argument against conscription is used in many Third World
nations today.
3 Ibid.
4 Letter, LCDR Richard M.S. Hart, Office of the Head, British
Defence Staff, British Embassy, Washington, D.C., 24 April 1978, and
comments from Mr. J. Pitt-Brooke, op.cit.
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that conscription was the only means likely to result in the
necessary numbers. Conscription was implemented, however, initially
it applied only to unmarried men.
In 1918 and 1919 demobilization occurred partly to get the
economy going again and partly because there was no need for such a
large military force--in spite of increased overseas commitments.
The depression did not hit the United Kingdom until the late 1920's,
and by that time the army had been reduced to close to its pre-war
strength. * Economy and imperialism, two opposing forces, did not
lead Britain to extend conscription in peacetime. But if a future
major war broke out, it was assumed that compulsory service would be
introduced. The introduction of the aeroplane, however, allowed
Britain a cheap way to play the role of a great imperial power for
another two decades.
Throughout the 1920s and for most of the 1930s, therefore, the
army was Britain's "Cinderella service," and it reverted back to its
nineteenth-century role as imperial policeman. The events in Europe
during the 1930s led Britain to concentrate on bombers and ships
rather than on building an army for use in Europe. Only a small
expeditionary force was prepared.
In 1938, the army concentrated on "Home defense and Imperial
defense" rather than on cooperating with other nations in the
defense of their territories. Only after the Munich agreement in
August of that year did Britain face the hard reality that European
commitments first and foremost meant a military presence.
On September 3, 1939 the first peacetime conscription act, the
National Service (Armed Forces) Act, was passed. These measures,
however, were too late. In total, the Army played a lesser part in
World War II than in the first World War, and it was smaller in
^Comments from Mr. J. Pitt-Brooke, op.cit.
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strength. This was partly caused by the heavy demands on industry
by the Royal Air Force, the need to man anti-aircraft weapons, and
the increase in administrative manpower.
In 1945 it appeared that Britain had taken note of the lessons
of their history. In addition, the country had come under the
standing obligation to deploy forces to the Continent, while earlier
this had occurred only occasionally. 1 With the exception of the
few months in 1939, Britain was for the first time experiencing
National (Military) Service in peacetime. 2 On January 1, 1949,
the main provisions of the National Service Act of 1947, later
consolidated in the National Service Act of 1948, came into force.
From that date on, eighteen-year old men were to be compulsorily
enlisted for military service for a period of twelve months in
addition to part-time service in years following. In 1950, at the
onset of the Korean crisis, the term of obligatory service was
raised from 18 months to two years.
During the 1950s, the British Army was stretched to the utmost.
Due to its role on the Continent which had been added to the
traditional one of imperial peace-keeping, it suffered under limited
resources and heavy commitments. In order to improve equipment in
the three services, the 1955 Statement on Defence announced a slight
reduction in manpower.
The 1956 Statement on Defence talked of military demands which
involved heavy charges on the balance of payments. The military
establishment and its supporting industries also locked up a
*This currently constitutes the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR)
plus the contingent in West Berlin, and part of the Royal Air
Force.
2Another reason for maintaining conscription might have been the
need to cut military spending to a minimum due to the preoccupation
with economic recovery, the demands for increases in personal
consumption, and the commitment to welfare programs.
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sizeable proportion of the materials and manpower needed to keep
British goods competitive in world markets.
1
The Suez operation in 1956 emphasized the severe economic
limits within which the British government had to operate, and by
1957 the need to retrench was evident. The Statement on Defence
announced that Britain would go nuclear and emphasize a smaller,
professional conventional force. This was not only for economic,
but also for strategic reasons. It was held that the role on the
Continent and the geographical position of the United Kingdom
required a standing force. Militia or home defense forces could not
contribute to the common defense. By 1962 the armed forces were to
be reduced from 690,000 to 375,000 men, and this would permit the
abolition of conscription. The Army's total strength was to be
limited to 185,000 men.
In order to save uniformed manpower, the administrative
overhead was to be civilianized to the highest degree possible. By
1976, civilian pay constituted approximately 17 percent of the total
defense budget. 2 The British Army of the Rhine (BA0R) was also
reduced from 80,000 to 55,000 men. After 1960 there were no further
call-ups, and Britain was once more the only European nation without
a "citizen army."
Britain had experienced a trend toward popular anti-
authoritarianism and doubt about the national role. The Army was
experiencing an identity crisis, there was a self-consciousness
about service lifestyle, and doubts about opportunities for a second
career. Some held that the decision to end conscription reflected
electoral rather than strategic or economic considerations.
However, these factors were probably not independent. Without
^Source: Sprout, Harold and Margaret, "Retreat from World Power,"
World Politics
,
Vol. 15, July 1963, p. 676.
^Defence Estimates 1977.
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doubt, a large military establishment meant a heavy peacetime burden
on the manpower and income of the country, and the overseas
obligations had a significant negative impact on the balance of
payments of a country so heavily dependent on imports.
In the past, Britain has experienced recruitment problems for
her all-volunteer force. Reasons given for these problems include
low birth rates in the 1950s, the tendency for boys to stay longer
in school as a result of the increased demand for higher education,
increased competition in labor markets, and better training
opportunities in civilian sector employment. * In 1968 the Defence
White Paper suggested that to combat these problems, it was required
that fringe benefits and living conditions offered by the armed
service be comparable with those in the civilian sector, and that a
closer association between the civilian and military population be
developed.
In 1969, it was announced that a new pay structure would be
implemented. The 1969 proposal by the National Board for Prices and
Incomes were based upon the new concept of the "Military Salary".
This concept involved paying the servicemen a salary fully
comparable to that of their civilian counterparts as well as setting
the charges for food and accommodation at a realistic level
comparable to those a civilian would face under similar
circumstances. Also, an "X-factor" would be added to military pay.
The "X-factor" is an amount paid to all servicemen over and above
the comparable rate to compensate for the extra disadvantages of
service life; e.g., the extra turbulence (frequent moves) involved.
It is not intended to compensate for the hazards which servicemen
may face. 2
1 Statement on the Defence Estimates , 1968.
2Comments on Paper by Mr. J. Pitt-Brooke, op.cit.
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In 1969, a unique characteristic of the British military system
was introduced; the recruitment of boys ages 15 to 17.* These
Junior Soldiers could enlist for a term of service up to their 18th
birthday, and thereafter in the regular military for up to 22
years. 2
Manpower Procurement Policies
Fig. 13 shows the manpower flows through the British Army.
Since May 1, 1972 non-commissioned ranks can enlist for three to 22
years of service, with a wide freedom of choice on the length and
terms of service. Recruits to non-commissioned ranks are committed
for only a minimum period of service (about three years, excluding
training) and, subject to that minimum, may leave after giving 18
months' notice. Commissions may be granted for short, medium, and
long term. In all three services, there are opportunities for
promotion from the ranks.
3
Flexible options for regular soldiers were adopted to aid
recruitment. However, manpower shortages continued in the 1970s. In
1977 and 1978, increasing numbers of experienced and well qualified
officers and servicemen chose to leave prematurely. A prime cause
was dissatisfaction with pay, but this was not all. The shortage,
especially of skilled personnel, meant that the remaining manpower
resources were overstretched, which in turn increased turbulence in
the lives of service personnel and their families. Reorganization
and the introduction of new equipment created additional demands.
^
^Before the school-leaving age was raised from 15 to 16, boys
could join at age 15.
2Major source: Col. Norman L. Dodd, "Future NCOs: The Junior
Soldiers of the British Army," Military Review , February 1974, pp.
39-47.
3
"Defence," Britain 1980 , Chapter 4, pp. 92-93.


































































































The Government promised to restore the Service's pay to full
comparability with that of their civilian counterparts. Recruiting
in 1979/80 was generally good and improved after the pay award. 1
Recruitment in 1980/81 has been even better than in 1979/80, and it
is now at record levels. Retention has also improved. 2
In addition to the Junior Soldiers consisting of early school-
leavers who later can enlist in the Regular Army, Britain also has
Cadet Forces. Here school -boys between 11 and 18 years old can
serve, and an interest in the military is developed. Some boys
enlist in the regular forces after service in the Cadet Forces.
Large number of Sea Cadets are now joining the Royal Navy and the
Merchant Navy. The same is true for recruitment to the Army from
the Army Cadet Force, but the expanded interest shown by young boys
has not been reflected in the recruitment of Army Cadet Force
officers, where there is still undermanning. The Air Training Corps
and RAF section of the Combined Cadet Force continue to provide a
valuable source of high quality recruits for the Royal Air
Force.
3
Today the British armed forces are dependent on civilian staff
for support functions. They contribute to defense policy making,
manage equipment projects, direct research and development programs,
train servicemen in many essential skills, work in defense
factories, shipyards, and in the research and development
establishments. On the operational side, civilian staff help
maintain Army vehicles, RAF's operational aircraft, etc.
ilbid, Sees. 607-609.
^Comments on Paper by Mr. J. Pitt-Brooke, op.cit.
^Ibid, Sec. 622. For example, before a young man enters the Royal
Military Academy at Sandhurst at age 18 as a potential officer, he
may have been a member of his school's contingent of Combined Cadet
Force. "British Army," op.cit., p. 83.
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A total of 277,000 civilians are employed by the Ministry of
Defence in 1980, of which 240,000 are based in the United Kingdom;
constituting about one third of the Civil Service. A recruiting
ban, however, was imposed from May to August 1979 throughout the
Civil Service, a ban which also applies to the Ministry of Defence.
Consequently, natural attrition reduced the number of civilian staff
with possible negative implications for military support.
Reserves *: There are basically four categories of reserves in
the British ground forces: (1) The Regular Reserves for soldiers,
(2) Regular Army Reserve of Officers , (3) the Long Term Reserves ,
which was established in 1964, constitutes soldiers who have served
between 12 and 21 years in the Regular Army and who remain in
reserve status without pay until age 45, (4) Pens i oners who are
soldiers with a certain minimum length of service and who qualify
for pension, are obligated for recall up to the age of 60 (at
present this is not implemented beyond age 55, and there are plans
to utilize only those with special skills), and (5) the Volunteer
Reserve which comprises men and women, not necessarily with previous
regular service, who have accepted liability for mobilization in an
emergency.
The Invididual Reserves include members from the Regular Army
Reserve of Officers, Regular Reserves, Long Term Reservists, and
Pensioners. All are liable for recall in case of mobilization,
however, only the Regular Reserves have a training liability. These
Individual Reserves provide a pool of men and women who have served
as full-time regulars of the armed forces to use as individual
reinforcements. As of January 1, 1980, the Individual Reserves
numbered 131,400. The breakdown was presented in Fig. 13.
^Partly taken from, Statement on the Defence Estimates , 1975.
Chapter IV (Reserve and Auxiliary Forces), p. 58, Paper given in the
Ministry of Defence by Mr. Nicholas Bevan, Head of Defence
Secretariat 7, and Comments on Paper by Mr. J. Pitt-Brooke, op.cit.
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The Regular Army Reserve of Officers are officers having served
at least 10 years in the Regular Army or TA, and who have a reserve
obligation varying to between age 50 and 60 depending on their rank,
length of service, and specialization.
The Regular Reserves consist of ex-service soldiers. Soldiers
having served less than six years in the Army are automatically
obligated to serve for a limited period in the Regular Reserves
until their service time totals seven years (average 3 to 6 years).
Soldiers having served more than six years are obligated to another
six years in the Regular Reserves, a total of 12 years. Currently
only men are under reserve obligation. However, there are plans to
obligate also women for reserve duty.
The bulk of the mobilization requirements are provided by the
Regular Reserves. This is natural because they have the most recent
regular experience and are generally young and fit. This pool of
Regular Reserves will be augmented with Long Term Reserves as well
as with the younger Pensioners. In addition, a substantial number
of retired officers will be called up. The role of this mobilized
manpower will be to fill individual functions in Regular and TA
units in order to bring these units to their full wartime strengths,
to provide battle casualty replacements, and in the United Kingdom,
to form small units for home defense tasks.
*
The Volunteer Reserve constitutes members of the Territorial
Army (before 1980, the Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve; TAVR)
and the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR). These are mainly organized
into units. Most of the personnel in the Territorial Army (TA) are
young, non-prior service personnel; some of them civilians normally
working in Ministry of Defence.
1-Bevan, op.cit.
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Members of the TA initially sign up for a three year period
though they can in practice leave at any time. In order to earn the
training bounty (payment) which is tax-free and ranges from 100
British pounds in the first year to 300 British pounds after three
years, a soldier must attend a camp of 15 consecutive days (overseas
every third year for those with a NATO role) and 12 other full days
of training annually. The soldier can undertake more training
voluntarily, and the goal is a norm of about 40 days annually. In
addition to the bounty, the soldier is paid at Regular Army rates
for each day's training. *
The TA units have a limited number of Regular officers and
NCOs, permanently attached for training and administration. It is
possible for a Territorial officer or soldier to serve for a year or
18 months in a Regular Army unit in BA0R or elsewhere, and then
return to his TA unit without loss of seniority or promotion that
would have accrued in his absence. In 1977, more than 20,000 TA
members trained in BA0R and about 1000 elsewhere.^
The Volunteer Reserve has some problems. There are
insufficient volunteers, they do not serve long enough, and all of
them do not do enough training. For example, the TA is still some
10,000 men short of the target strength, and many soldiers serve
less than three years. A recent improvement in bounty increased the
strength by 4000 men. It is now higher than at any time since a
major reorganization in 1967. In addition, the Prime Minister made
a special appeal to employers whose cooperation is seen as essential
in allowing staff time off for training. ^
1-Bevan, op.cit.
^"British Army," op.cit., p. 87.
^Bevan, op.cit.
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Peacetime and Wartime Ground Force Structure 1
The strength of the British ground forces as of January 1,
1980, is shown in Table 4. Overviews over the deployment,
organization, and structure are shown in Table 5 and Fig. 14.
The British ground forces consist of (1) the British Army of
the Rhine (BAOR), (2) the Berlin Field Force, (3) the United Kingdom
Land Force (UKLF) which includes the Territorial Army (TA) and Home
Defence, and (4) the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR). 2
The main combat element of the BAOR is the First British Corps
(1BR Corps). Together with the German, Dutch, and Belgian Corps, it
is part of the Northern Army Group (NURTHAG) under the command of a
British officer. After the reorganization announced in the 1977
Defence Estimates , the existing three infantry divisions were
eliminated. Today the BAOR consists of four armoured divisions, one
artillery division, and units of the 5th Field Force. 3 In an
emergency, these forces would be reinforced from Britain by the
remainder of the 5th Field Force, the 7th Field Force, other home
based units (including some from the Territorial Army), Regular Army
Reservists, and individuals from the Army's training and support
organizations.
After full mobilization, the strength of the BAOR would be more
than doubled, and up to 70 percent of the British Army would be in
Central Europe under NATO command. The reserve and reinforcement
forces are seen as essential to the ability of the BAOR to fulfill
^Source unless otherwise noted, Statement on the Defence
Estimates , 1980, Sees. 306-310, 348-349.
2Letter from LCDR Richard M.S. Hart, op.cit., 14 April 1978.
3
"British Army," op.cit., p. 82.
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Table 4
THE UNITED KINGDOM: GROUND FORCES PERSONNEL 3


















aSource: Statement on the Defence Estimates
, 1980,
Vol . II, Tables 4.1 and 4.3.
^Due to differences in sources, the numbers in Fiq. 13
and in the text differ slightly from those in this table.
Present plans do not envisage calling out all of the
Individual Reserves in case of emergency, rather, the
numbers represent the size of the pool from which to
draw. Some are not required, others have emigrated, are
unfit or too old, or have left the service.
Consequently, the actual number called up in case of
emergency would be less than shown above. Source: Paper








United Kingdom Land Forces (UKLF)
:
United Kingdom Mobile Force (UKMF)
6th Field Force with 5 (3 Reg., 2 TA) infantry battalions, etc.
7th Field Force with 3 Reg. and 2 TA units.
8th Field Force (3 Reg., 2 TA batt. for Home Defence).
1 batt. for ACE Mobile Force (Land).
1 SAS regiment
1 Gurkha infantry battalion
HQ North Ireland: 3 infantry brigades, HQS, 1 armoured
reconnaissance regiment, variable number of major units in
infantry role, 1 SAS, 3 engineering squadrons, 2 army aviation
squadrons, and 1 flight unit.
2. West Germany:
British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) : 1 corps HQ, 4 armoured
divisions, 5th Field Force, 1 artillery division.
West Berlin: Berlin Field Force
3. The United Kingdom also has troops in Brunei, Hong Kong, Cyprus,
Gibraltar, and Belize.
Reserves:
The Regular Reserves, The Territorial Army, The Ulster Defence
Regiment.
Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies,
The Military Balance 1979-1980
, pp. 20-21. SAS= special air




























































































































































































































































its wartime role. At any one time, some 3000 men from the BAOR are
on short tours in Northern Ireland.
*
The UKLF commands nine Army districts, while the HQ Northern
Ireland is under the direct command of the Ministry of Defence. The
Army districts command varying numbers of regular and TA units and
those Field Forces based in the United Kingdom in peacetime. In
case of tension, the units not deployed to reinforce BAOR would
protect defense and other installations at home.
2
The volunteer element of the Army reserve force is now known
once again as the Territorial Army (TA). Strengths have risen
sharply since the announcement of the change of title and of
increased rates of bounty (compensation). Their equipment,
organization, and missions are also in process of being changed.
3
The TA is organized into two types of units: (1) independent
units recruited from the local population, and (2) sponsored units
and pools, which are specialists recruited from all over the country
and sponsored by their own Army/Service Central Volunteer
Headquarters. 4
When the reorganization is completed, the TA will consist of 38
infantry battalions, 44 other major units, and 250 minor units.
About 50 percent of the TA is committed to reinforce British troops
in West Germany. Most of the TA units combine with regular
formations to make up the 6th and 7th Field Forces, allocated to
llbid, Sec. 315. In 1977, Britain's total mobilization commitment
to Europe was 78,000 Regulars and 60,000 Reservists. "Britain's
NATO Army," NATO's Fifteen Nations , April-May, 1977, pp. 82-88.
^ Statement on the Defence Estimates , 1980, sec. 348.
3 Ibid, Sec. 619.
^Comments on Paper from Mr. J. Pitt-Brooke, op.cit., January
1981.
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SACEUR as part of the UK Mobile Force (UKMF), with the bulk of the
remainder forming the 8th Field Force (also with regular units) for
defense of the United Kingdom. 1
The TA units cover nearly the whole range of Army functions.
There are armoured reconnaissance regiments, infantry battal lions,
engineer regiments, and artillery regiments as well as specialized
units like transport, Special Air Service, and medical. The
operational role of the TA are (a) to complete the order of battle
of the British Army of the Rhime and to provide certain units in
support of NATO HQs, and (b) to assist in maintaining the security
of the United Kingdom home base.
According to current plans, approximately 70 percent of the TA
would be deployed on the Continent in case of war. The TA is
provided with equipment which is so far as possible identical to the
equipment provided to regular units with the same role. Because of
limitations on what part-time soldiers can do, TA units for example
do not operate tanks. However, recent TA equipment issues include
the BLOWPIPE air defense missile, the 105 mm light gun, and the
latest CLANSMAN radios. Future plans include adding the MILAN
anti-tank guided weapon.
2
The UKMF consists of about 13,500 Regular and TA soldiers and
includes one parachute battalion. 3
The Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) provides military support for
the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) in eleven Police Divisions in
Northern Ireland. ^ The UDR, which is a part-time regiment, forms
1"UK improves terms of service for reservists," International
Defense Review , No. 7, 1979, p. 1078.
2Bevan, op.cit.
^ Statement on the Defence Estimates
,
1980, Sec. 352.
^Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1980, Sec. 506.
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an integral part of the Security Forces in Northern Ireland, and its
duties include guarding key installations, manning checkpoints, and
providing mobile patrols. In wartime, the UDR's function would be
home defence. The recruitment of women to the UDR began in August
1973, and their primary task was to search women for explosives and
weapons as well as to perform administrative work.
The UDR, an important regiment of the British Army, is
organized into eleven battalions.* It provides a company-size
force each weekend, available for deployment anywhere in Northern
Ireland.
In addition to the organization already mentioned, Britain also
has highly trained and well equipped ground forces as part of NATO's
specialist reinforcements; some 1800 men assigned to Allied Command
Europe Mobile Force (AMF), and forces for SACLANT whose deployment
options include the reinforcement of Norway, Denmark, and the
Atlantic Islands. 2
In the context of a NATO war, mobilization (call -out) of
reserves—both Volunteer and Regular—would be effected by means of
a Queen's Order, in effect an administrative instrument. This Order
does not require prior approval of the Parliament, and it becomes
effective as soon as it is signed. Once signed, mobilization could
be implemented either all at once or phased—depending on the
situation. In the first instance, the Order would be announced
through the media.
3
lM Britain's NATO Army," op.cit., p. 87.




It is not seen as politically feasible in Britain to introduce
a national registration system and personal identification number
for all residents.
Having no plans for registering or conscripting either males or
females in case of emergency, British defense authorities expressed
that they do not feel that the absence of a national registration
system constitutes any military problem. The United Kingdom plans
to fight wars with the same volunteer army they maintain in
peacetime.
^
A new mobilization scheme, making use of the peacetime training
liability of the Regular Reserves and affecting the registration of
reservists, will be introduced in November 1980 and be fully
effective in April 1981. Under the old system, the Regular Reserves
were simply required to report their whereabouts in writing every
quarter, and when mobilized, to report to a central depot according
to their regimental affiliation. No direct personal contact was
maintained with these reservists in peacetime, consequently the
system relied on self-reporting. However, there was a small
incentive to report, between 18 and 35 British pounds (taxable).
Under the new arrangement, in exchange for a sporting grant of
100 British pounds (taxable), Regular Reserves are expected to keep
a complete set of personal combat equipment (not including weapons)
and uniforms at home, and will have to report in person to one of
^Major sources are (1) Interview, Ministry of Defence, Defence
Secretariat 7/Service Personnel /Mobi
1
ization, London, 26 September
1980, and (2) Individual Reinforcement Plan (IRP) , Press Release,
Ministry of Defence, London, November 1979.
^A recent upsurge in public interest in conscription, is more for
social (unemployment and "getting young people off the streets")




approximately 400 local Reporting Centers, one day a year for kit
checks, medical assessment, and documentation updates. If
necessary, introductory training for new personal weapons and
procedures will be carried out.
Such ante facto equipping, training, and trade classification,
together with the revised local reporting procedures, will
materially improve the readiness and speed of reaction of the
Regular Reserves. Initially, 50,000 reservists will be involved.
It is hoped that reservists coming to the end of his Regular Reserve
service will be encouraged to extend it, and that sufficient Long
Term Reservists, selected Pensioners, and members of the Regular
Army Reserve of Officers will volunteer to undertake the annual
reporting liability and thus be more rapidly available for
deployment in an emergency.
It is expected that the new arrangement will cut the Regular
Reserves' mobilization time by 50 percent, and that both the Regular
Reserves and the Territorial Army will be mobilized and ready for
deployment within M+10 days.
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III. SUMMARY COMPARISON AND CONCLUSIONS
Little comparative work has been done on manpower policies and
force structures in NATO Europe. Most prior studies have
concentrated on the larger allies; West Germany, France, and the
United Kingdom, and on their peacetime forces rather than on their
wartime potentials. This approach led to nations being judged
largely on their peacetime establishments while augmentation or
reserve forces were largely ignored.
There exists no apparent evidence that NATO membership has
significantly influenced these four nations' manpower policies and
ground force structures. This study clearly shows that Denmark, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Norway, and the United Kingdom have
developed very different ground force structures with respect to
both manpower policies and organization.
PEACETIME AND WARTIME ORGANIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT
Analysis of the ground forces of Denmark, the Federal Republic
of Germany, Norway, and the United Kingdom illustrates that their
contrasting arrangements are responses to different conditions of
population density, terrain, and internal communications, as well as
to differences in geo-strategic location, traditions, and defense
missions.
Table 6 provides a summary overview of the four nations' ground
force wartime potentials and the expected time-phased availability.
Denmark
Denmark, a small, densely populated, flat country with good
means of transportation, expects a potential attack to take place
anywhere. Its standing force is organized into units dispersed






Standing Force 8,500 (all-volunteer)
Augmentation Force 4,500 (stand-by reserves)
Coveri ng Force 13 ,000
Covering Force Reserve 12,000
Five brigades, etc 25,000
Other Reserve Units 29,000
Total 54 , 000
Local Defense Force 24,000
Home Guard approx. 70,000 (mainly non-prior
Personnel Replacement Depot ^... 12,000 service)
TOTAL GROUND FORCE WARTIME POTENTIAL 160,000 (M+3 days)
Percent reservists: approx. 90 .
Percent of population in wartime ground force: 3.1.








Mobi 1 i zable 445,000
Tota 1 51 ,000
TOTAL GROUND FORCE WARTIME POTENTIAL 950,000 (M+3 days)
Percent reservists: ^5.
Percent of population in wartime ground force: 1 .5 .
(continued)
Population figures are taken from The International Institute
for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1979-1980 , London, 1979,






Field Army Reserve 70,000
Total 78 ,000
Local Defense Fo rce 60 , 000
Home Guard (80 percent of 80,000) 64,000 (mainly prior
service)
TOTAL GROUND FORCE WARTIME POTENTIAL 202,000 (M+2 days)
Percent reservists: approx. 90 .
Percent of population in wartime ground force: 4.9.
THE UNITED KINGDOM (population 55,960,000)
Regular Army
Peacetime 1 59 ,100
Individual Reserves. . .. 1 31 ,700
Total 290 ,800
Territorial Army 62 , 000
Ulster Defence Regiment 7,400
TOTAL GROUND FORCE WARTIME POTENTIAL 360,200 (M+10 days)
Percent reservists: 56. a
Percent of population in wartime ground force: 0.6.
a 6ecause not all Individual Reserves will be required or be
available upon mobilization, this number constitutes an upper
limit. It should be noted that the British Ministry of Defence also
employed 277,000 civilians in 1980, many of them filling functions
which elsewhere are performed by uniformed personnel.
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Danes also expect to be able to rapidly augment the standing force.
Therefore, the 8500 regular long-term volunteers in the standing
force are used for manning high-priority combat units and key
weapons and positions. The wartime Field Army is mainly organized
into armoured infantry brigades.
The Federal Republic of Germany
The Federal Republic of Germany, a partly flat, densely
populated, and urbanized country, borders on sizeable Warsaw Pact
potentials. * Allied forces are stationed in West Germany and have
responsibility for certain sectors. West Germany itself has a Field
Army and a well-trained, well -equipped Territorial Army. The latter
remains under national command even in times of crisis and is tasked
with support of Field Army units in forward defense as well as rear
area defense tasks.
Field Army units and some Territorial Army units have high
peacetime readiness. Field Army units will use reservists only for
replacing personnel with little training, to man peacetime units to
full wartime strength, and for individual replacements. The
Territorial Army will use reservists to man peacetime units to
wartime strength, to man equipment-holding units, and for individual
replacements.
The Field Army is organized into relatively heavy units. Out
of 36 brigades, 17 are armoured and 15 armoured infantry. A major
part of the Territorial Army is organized into the equivalent of
armoured infantry brigades, the remaining into light infantry
battalions.
*The Soviet Union alone has a total Army strength of 1,825,000.
Reserves (all services) total 25 million of which five million have
served in the last five years. Soviet conscripts have a reserve
obligation until age 50. Source: The International Institute for
Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1979-1980, pages 9 and 11.
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Norway
Norway's strategically weakest point is the sparsely populated
north, an area located far from sources of either external or major
internal reinforcements. Norway, therefore, has its 8000-man
combat-ready standing force structured into both combat and support
units, the bulk of which is deployed to North Norway at all times.
Because the population is concentrated in South Norway where the
chances of a surprise attack is believed to be smaller, its defense
is based on mobilization units.
Having the largest proportion of the population of any NATO
nation in the wartime ground force, Norway has its manpower mainly
organized into infantry brigades. Attempts have been made to
upgrade at least two to armoured infantry brigades, however, funds
have not yet been made available for this purpose.
The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom's primary mission is to provide forces for
defense of Continental Europe. At all times, approximately one
third of its Regular Army is stationed in West Germany; i.e., the
British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) and the Berlin Field Force. In an
emergency, these forces would be reinforced from Britain by Regular
Army units, Regular Army Reservists, some Territorial Army units,
and by individuals from the Army's training and support
organization. After full mobilization, the strength of the BAOR
would be more than doubled, and up to 70 percent of the Regular Army
would be in Central Europe under NATO command. The remainder of the
United Kingdom Land Forces are tasked with home defense or other
NATO roles. A limited number of troops is stationed outside NATO
territory. The British Regular Army is also rather heavily
equipped, being mainly organized into armoured divisions.
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Time-phased Availability
Table 6 showed that in the event of crisis, these four nations
plan to mobilize a significant number of reservists. Denmark and
Norway must mobilize approximately 90 percent of full wartime
strength. Corresponding percentages for West Germany and Britain
are 65 and up to 56, respectively.
The readiness level achieved by this mobilization potential,
however, is probably matched only by a small portion of most
nations' peacetime forces (ref. "effective force strength", Fig. 1).
The United Kingdom expects to be fully mobilized within 10 days,
while the other three nations expect to use only three days to reach
full wartime potential.
*
All reservists are not necessarily mobilized simultaneously.
For example, Denmark and the Federal Republic of Germany have part
of their reservists in stand-by status, implying that these men can
be recalled without a regular mobilization declaration and are
expected to be in place within one day. The three nations utilizing
conscripts can also recall reservists within the budgeted man-days
for reserve training without requiring a mobilization order. The
Danish and the Norwegian Home Guards have as one main task to ensure
a successful mobilization by directing traffic, protecting vital
transportation links, depots, etc. These men can be mobilized
within hours. All four nations' reservists are equipped with
mobilization orders permitting phased call-up according to need.
Once mobilized, Norway and the United Kingdom face possibly the
greatest deployment problems. Norway must lift some reserve
reinforcements from South to North Norway, a distance which has few
and vulnerable transportation links. To be effective, part of the
*An analysis of transition problems associated with mobilization
as well as a detailed description of the Norwegian system is found
in Sohlberg (June 1980), Chapter IV.
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British Regular Army as well as reserve forces must be lifted from




Current manpower procurement policies reflect traditions.
Except for the United Kingdom, these countries have retained con-
scription as a major manpower procurement method. Conscription was
written into the Danish and Norwegian Constitutions. However, the
West German Basic Law of 1949 had to be changed to allow a military,
and in 1956 several laws referring to conscription were passed.
Peacetime forces : Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany,
and Norway—which to varying degrees have served as battlegrounds
and are primarily concerned with territorial defense—have histori-
cally relied on conscription. A reduction or elimination of the
conscripted component of military manpower has been debated, but in
general the concept has wide acceptance and is seen as necessary and
desi rable.
In contast, Britain's role, like that of the United States and
Canada, has been to send expeditionary forces overseas. Only during
and immediately after the two World Wars did the United Kingdom rely
on conscription. For the last two decades, Britain has had an all-
volunteer force.
The peacetime armies of Denmark and the Federal Republic of
Germany have 30 and 51 percent conscripts, respectively.
Consequently, their armies could be characterized as volunteer
armies with conscript components. Norway, on the other hand, has 80
percent conscripts in the peacetime army.
^The British problem of having to deploy both peacetime and
reserve forces to West Germany in case of crisis, is shared by the
United States, the Netherlands, and Belgium.
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In Denmark, only one third of each male age cohort completes
regular active duty in one of the armed services. Corresponding
numbers for West Germany and Norway are 58 percent and somewhat over
60 percent, respectively. 1 Approximately 90 percent of Norwegian
male age cohorts serve somewhere within Total Defense. Universality
in conscription, therefore, is only approximated if non-military
Total Defense is included.
Reserve forces : None of these four nations recruit reservists
directly into regular army roles. Men and women without prior
service, however, may volunteer to the Danish Home Guard and to the
British Territorial Army and the Ulster Defence Regiment. The
Norwegian Home Guard consists mainly of prior-service personnel, but
men and women may volunteer for service. Reservists in the West
German Territorial Army have completed their regular active duty
period in either the Field Army or the Territorial Army.
Regular and Reserve Policies
Table 7 shows the minimum regular and reserve obligation in the
three conscript nations.
Denmark : Danish conscripts initially serve nine months in a
Training Force, a period during which they have no wartime
assignment and are trained for their reserve function. After this
"apprentice period", they may volunteer for additional service in
the Standing Force. If not, they enter reserve status for a maximum
of 8 years. During this period they may be recalled when the
mobilization system is tested or for short refresher training.
^France is another NATO nation attempting to approach universal
conscription. However, never has more than two-thirds of each male
age cohort been called up for military service. In the future,
universal conscription will be even more difficult to approximate
because between 1976 and 1980, 17 army regiments have, or will have
been disbanded. Le Monde , January 31, 1980. Outside NATO, a high
degree of universality in male military conscription is achieved in










Denmark 9 months max. 8 years
The Federal Republ ic
of Germany 1 5 months max. 6 years
Norway 12 months 25 years
Summarized from text. The United Kingdom, having only
volunteers, enlists non-commissioned ranks from three to
22 years.
DThe numbers refer to the actual peacetime obligation,
a period during which the reservists may be recalled for
peacetime reserve duty. In case of emergencies, the
obligation can be extended according to current laws.
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The Federal Republic of Germany : Of the three conscript
nations, West Germany has the longest minimum regular military
obligation. The 15 months regular active duty may take place in the
Field Army or in the Territorial Army. Subsequently, they are in
reserve status for a maximum of six years.
Norway : The majority of Norwegian army conscripts intitally
receive three months basic training in South Norway followed by nine
months in the Standing Army in North Norway. Upon discharge, they
are assigned reserve roles in the Field Army until age 35, followed
by 10 years in the Local Defense Force. Reservists who are assigned
to units earmarked for reinforcement of North Norway, also
participate in mobilization exercises in the north.
The United Kingdom : The United Kingdom enlists non-
commissioned ranks for periods lasting from three to 22 years.
Soldiers having served less than six years in the Regular Army are
obligated to assignment in the Regular Reserves until their service
time totals seven years. Soldiers having served more than six years
are obligated to another six years in the Regular Reserves. Britain
also has Individual Reserves who constitute a pool of men to use as
reinforcements and as individual replacements. The Volunteer
Reserve consists of the Territorial Army and the Ulster Defence
Regiment. Approximately 50 percent of the Territorial Army has a
NATO role, and every three years these part-time soldiers
participate in exercises in West Germany.
Reserve training : Currently available information on annual
man-day budgets for recalling reservists in the various ground
forces is presented in Table 8. Combined with the data in Table 7,
one can conclude that West Germany has the relatively youngest
conscripts in the wartime force. They have the longest regular
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Denmark also has a relatively young wartime force, retaining
reservists for maximum eight years. However, they have only nine
months regular duty and are rarely recalled for refresher training
while in reserve status. Norwegian reservists tend to be older than
those of the other three countries, but they are recalled regularly
for refresher training. The British Regular Army Reserves generally
receive no refresher training; however, they have a minimum of three
years prior service. The majority of Territorial Army members have
no prior service but receive annual training.
Conclusions
Of these four nations, only the United Kingdom has an all-
volunteer force. * Britain also has the smallest percentage of its
population in the wartime force (see Table 6), women figure more
prominently in its armed forces than elsewhere, and a significant
number of defense functions are filled by civilians. On the other
hand, Norway has the largest percentage of the population in the
wartime force, the highest degree of universality in conscription,
and the fewest long-term volunteers among the non-commissioned
ranks. ^ One possible conclusion may be that manning an armed
force which is large relative to the population base, may require
conscription, but that a high degree of universality in conscription
also deters voluntary long-term enlistments. In addition, in order
^Within the last two decades, the United Kingdom and the United
States returned to their traditional all -volunteer force. However,
in 1980 the United States reintroduced registration of young men for
a possible future conscription requirement. Outside NATO, several
nations which earlier had all -volunteer forces, are turning to
conscription. For example, Jordan and Saudi Arabia are in the
process of introducing or expanding conscription. Lebanon is
planning to introduce conscription possibly by 1982 (the earlier
decision to introduce conscription in 1979 was delayed). Malaysia
and the Republic of South Korea are studying the possibilities for
introducing conscription.
^Fully mobilized, Norway has more than seven percent of the
population in uniform. Outside NATO, greater percentages are
observed, for example, in Sweden and in Israel.
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to man even a relatively small defense sector solely with
volunteers, it may be necessary not only to offer substantial
financial incentives, but also to enlarge the available manpower
pool by offering women an expanded military role and to
"civi lianize" as many defense functions as possible.
It is clear that the concept of mass armies manned by
inexperienced conscripts no longer holds for the four study nations.
The conscripts are better qualified upon induction, the training
period is used more efficiently, and the cost-effectiveness of
soldiers over both the regular and reserve period is considered. In
addition, part of the conscripted component consists of "quasi
volunteers"--many have either been obligated to or have volunteered
for training over and above the minimum. In addition, the amount of
reserve training received by an individual depends on the priority
of the function, whether new equipment has been introduced or not,
etc. In reality, therefore, conscription does not necessarily imply
equal service for all young men.*
Attempts to approximate universal conscription combined with
prolonged reserve obligations may result in relatively inflexible or
rigid force structures. For example, the Norwegian ground forces
have remained basically unchanged over the last thirty years. This
continuity certainly has advantages because the system, and in
particular the mobilization system, has been refined over the years.
However, as the environment and military technology changes,
manpower policies along the lines of those observed in Norway, may
inhibit changes that would otherwise have been made. The other
three study nations have a much larger proportion of long-term
1 Sweden and Egypt are examples of two nations with differentiated
service for conscripts. Sweden assigns the longest service
obligations to men with the most (useful) civilian education or
training. In contrast, because the Egyptian military also has an
important function in developing the nation's manpower, males with
less than high school serve three years, those with high school two
years, and university graduates serve only one year.
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volunteers and retain reservists for a much shorter period of time.
Consequently, it is much easier for the latter three nations to
implement organizational changes and to introduce and adapt to new
technology. Denmark drastically changed its ground force structure
and policies in 1973, West Germany in 1979, and the United Kingdom
when it eliminated conscription, as well as in later years.
While Norway, for example, may require a high degree of
universality in conscription to take care of the large defense task
relative to the population, the danger certainly exists that
universality may predominate and take attention away from major
military objectives.
Utilization of conscripts has changed over the postwar period.
Some of the adjustments reflect civilian sector developments.
First, the average European conscript has received better and more
relevant training and education prior to induction than ever before,
and the armed services have taken advantage of this. On the other
hand, the soldiers also demand better living conditions, training
relevant to their return to the civilian sector, and better
compensation and conditions while in the military. As a result, the
cost per unit of effective time of a soldier has increased and
served to offset (some of?) the advantages of improved civilian
training.
Other adjustments in utilization reflect military sector
developments. Military technology is increasingly more
sophisticated and requires more extensive training for operation or
for maintenance. This has led to an increased use of longer term
volunteers and conscripts with extended obligations, who are then
given the more complex tasks.
Women have a limited role in the armed services of all these
nations, but figure most prominently in the British all -volunteer
forces. Because male age cohorts are shrinking as 1990 is
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approached, the conscript nations are also looking into an expanded
role for women in the regular armed services. None of these nations
currently obligate women for mobilization assignments upon
completion of regular service. However, in some cases they may
volunteer for mobilization roles. *
Extensive reliance on civilian sector resources in case of
crisis, the concept of a Total Defense service obligation, as well
as (equitable) conscription may require a well -functioning national
and military registration system. Of the four study countries, only
Denmark and Norway have national registration and identification
numbers for all residents and have regular (annual) contact with all
reservists for updating addresses, health status, occupation and
training, etc. The other nations have regular contact only with
some reservists, the remainder of the reserve system relying on
self-reporting.
The Danish, West German, and Norwegian reliance on
mobilization forces are to varying degrees supported by the Total
Defense concept whereby manpower as well as other civilian sector
resources can legally be requisitioned in a crisis, and by a ground
force structure with graduated responsibilities to ensure a
successful mobilization. For example, Norway and Denmark have Home
Guards which can be mobilized within hours, and their primary task
is to ensure successful mobilization.
*A West German comparative study of the role of women showed that
women are assigned combat roles only in Algeria where there are
female fighter pilots. Elsewhere, women may receive some combat
training, but mainly intended for self-defense or, outside NATO, for
defense of their place of employment (industrial defense).
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CONSEQUENCES OF DIVERSE MANPOWER POLICIES AND FORCE STRUCTURES
The diversity of manpower policies and ground force structures
demonstrated in this study requires consideration in Alliance joint
equipment procurement programs, in military balance assessments, and
in force reduction negotiations.
NATO Coordination of Equipment Procurement
Rationalization, standardization, and interoperability (RSI)
are promoted as means to improve the efficiency with which NATO's
resources are being used. However, the diversity of manpower
policies and ground force structures observed in NATO may limit both
the feasibility and the desirability of many forms of standardiza-
tion. It is also possible that diversity in some areas means
strength rather than weakness.
Countries vary with respect to reserve augmentations, the use
of reservists, and in the length of reserve obligation. There are
great variations in military experience, in the interval since
regular active duty, and in reserve training patterns. Therefore,
the time required to fully introduce new equipment will vary from
nation to nation. Differences in reliance on reserve augmentations
also result in variations in the proportion of equipment stored and
only used for reserve exercises. Consequently, equipment
replacement rates also vary from country to country.
Technological developments have influenced force structures and
manpower policies, but manpower policies and practices have also
influenced the technological standard (level and complexity)
selected for the ground forces. For example, much of the equipment
in Norwegian ground forces is selected for ease of training, and
older technology is passed on to forces with older reservists to
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reduce the need for retraining and upgrading of skills.*
Topography, climate, and soil conditions also put requirements on
technical characteristics. 2 Standardization, therefore, may
require manpower changes, modifications in the standardized
component itself or in complementary items, or other policy changes.
The net effect to NATO, therefore, may be uncertain.
Any discussion or evaluation, therefore, of introducing
standardized equipment in NATO must take the diversity of policies
and practices into consideration.
Military Balance Assessments and Force Reduction Negotiations
The observed differences in manpower policies and force
structures also raise doubts about how to sum the NATO parts and
about the meaning attached to NATO/Warsaw Pact comparisons as they
are usually presented.
This study provided additional evidence that the numbers
provided by current, standard comparative defense publications are
insufficient for a comparison of wartime force capabilities in NATO,
for a comparison of NATO/Warsaw Pact capabilities, or as a baseline
for meaningful force reduction negotiations. Traditional measures
like defense budgets, aggregate manpower numbers, length of regular
active duty, etc. should be interpreted in light of qualitative
differences.
A study along the lines of the present one should also be done
for other NATO nations and for Warsaw Pact nations. Data required
*The evidence provided in this study also indicates that the
larger the ground forces are relative to the population, the more
lightly equipped are the units.
^For example, West Germany decided that topography and the good
communication links permit wheeled rather than tracked artillery
units.
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include at least the following: pre-induction training relevant to
the military sector, length of regular active duty, length of
reserve obligation and the pattern (frequency and duration) of
actual rather than obligatory reserve training, length of total
military obligation (regular plus reserve), relationship between
civilian sector training or occupation and military functional
assignment, the unit structure of the forces, the role of conscripts
and volunteers and of regular active and reserve manpower in the
wartime organization, the time-phased availability of wartime
strengths, and the degree to which defense functions are manned by
civilians.
A multi -dimensional assessment of manpower policies and
manpower dimensions of ground force structures, is complicated,
costly, and time-consuming, but it results in a more meaningful
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